THE NEW REPUBLIC

## The Imbalance of Terror

*Washington and Moscow daily insist that aggressive attack is the last thing either would initiate, that war would be madness, but that each will not be deterred from doing what it must by fear of possible calamity. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Paul H. Nitze, has warned that "any interference with our central rights in Berlin must be viewed by us as the straw that breaks the camel's back." Some days earlier, Khrushchev's anticipated rejection of a ban on nuclear tests in the earth's atmosphere coincided with the indefinite recess, after 340 sessions, of the Geneva talks; NATO maneuvers in Turkey are about to begin; Russia is conducting its war games in the Arctic Circle; US troop strength in Europe is to be increased by 40,000; and sober Americans are discussing seriously, though somewhat self-consciously, where and whether safety might be found in the event of Armageddon. Among these portentous developments, the sudden Soviet reversal of its position on the resumption of nuclear testing is a primary subject of Western speculation. It is striking that not a single Soviet expert, to our knowledge, had discussed publicly the possibility that the Russians would be the first to renounce the three-year-old moratorium. Khrushchev's timing, however, and his emphasis on the Big Bomb buttress the supposition that the Soviet decision was influenced heavily by immediate political considerations and was calculated to demonstrate – internally and abroad – Russia's willingness to match the Kennedy Administration's "toughness." His reference to the very large but relatively inefficient 100-megaton weapon was surely intended to dramatize to the peoples of the West, and to what are called the unaligned as well, the destruction which might result from a war over Berlin. This* (Continued on page 3)

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# T.R.B. from Washington

*Administration Morale*

★ A chart of Kennedy Administration morale would show that its deepest depression was reached during Labor Day week. A sense of frustration, almost of doom, pervaded the White House and State Department. The good news about school integration and the high rate of economic recovery was not enough to ward off the chill induced by "foul winds of war" blowing from Moscow. For the first time since the Berlin crisis set in, war was talked about not merely as something to prepare for so that it could be averted but something to prepare for so that it could be fought. Perhaps force would turn out to be the only alternative to surrender after all.

This mood had been brought on, ironically, by two "propaganda victories." The first had been won the day the Communists started to build their barbed wire and concrete wall through Berlin. This had been an admission by Khrushchev that his system couldn't stand open competition with freedom in Germany. The second had been Khrushchev's announcement that the Soviet Union would resume atom bomb tests in the open. For once America's endurance had been more rugged than Russia's.

So what happened? It gradually dawned upon Administration strategists that, propaganda apart, the practical effects of the Berlin wall had been far more damaging to the West than at first perceived. The world at large seemed little impressed by the violation of agreements it entailed and even less by the restraint Western powers displayed in deciding against harsh measures of retaliation. It now appeared that the wall had divided Berlin in a spiritual as well as physical sense and that the city would never again be what it had been either as a symbol of freedom or as a booming metropolis.

As for Khrushchev's resumption of bomb tests, it became apparent almost at once that his decision to abandon all but the thinnest pretense of devotion to "peaceful coexistence" and to resort instead to simple terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy was having, so far as he was concerned, the desired effect. Delegates to the Belgrade conference were shocked but not shocked enough to denounce Soviet bullying. They went ahead with their prearranged plan to deplore Western colonialism and then view Washington and Moscow with equal disapproval for pushing the world to the brink of war.

To cap the week's events, Khrushchev reiterated at a ceremonial for Nehru, who had traveled to Moscow as an emissary of the Belgrade neutrals, that he would be happy to meet with President Kennedy to discuss the signing of a German peace treaty – and, by implication, nothing else.

*Kennedy's Response*

★ Kennedy's patience didn't last out the bad week. Although he had planned to withstand pressures for testing long enough to reap the full benefit of Khrushchev's prior capitulation, he held off for only two days.

At Hyannis Port, over the holiday, he decided after the second Soviet test explosion that he would order resumption of US tests if and when there was a third. He disregarded arguments by Ed Murrow and others to delay longer. Then, in signing the foreign aid authorization bill, he commented that henceforth "we should give great attention and consideration to those who have our view of the world crisis" – obviously a threat addressed to the neutrals who had met in Belgrade. And, finally, the Pentagon announced that 40,000 more American troops would be sent to Europe soon.

At the end of the week, the foul winds blew even more strongly than they had at the beginning. If Khrushchev had been trying to exasperate Kennedy, he had succeeded. If he had been trying to frighten the neutrals, he had succeeded even better. However, he had not frightened Kennedy. And there were some signs that his tactics with the neutrals had been pressed beyond the point of diminishing return – and that he'd find it out at the session of the United Nations starting this month.

*Notes*

★ Kennedy's speech to the UN probably will include a new disarmament plan now being worked on by John McCloy. . . . Until Khrushchev got Kennedy's hackles up again, the Administration had been considering, among others, a proposal to sponsor some kind of UN trusteeship for West Berlin. . . . American communicators blushed twice last week – once for Jack Paar's incredible caper in Berlin and once for Drew Pearson's column addressed to Khrushchev, written in the same advice-to-the-kiddies vein as his letters to his grandchildren suggesting a 30-day cooling-off period to get the world back on its tracks. . . . Pentagon exposure of General Walker as a member of the John Birch Society left Senator Thurmond holding a bag with a hole in it. By the criteria Walker used in judging good Americanism, Chairman Russell of the Senate Armed Services Committee had a 60 percent rating and Thurmond himself 78 percent. . . . The President is resentful of the assumption, particularly prevalent among American correspondents in Berlin, that the US has shirked an obligation to protect at any cost the right of East Germans to escape. Those who can't stand Communism, he feels, had ample time to make their decision to go West before the border was closed. . . . After five years of much talk and no action, Congress appears ready to authorize a federal juvenile delinquency program. For the eleventh straight year, the Senate Juvenile Delinquency Subcommittee reported last month, the United States has experienced an increase in juvenile crime: "Never before in the history of this country has there been such a persistent rise in juvenile depredation." Between 1948 and 1959, referrals to juvenile courts shot up 177 percent, while the population in this age group (10 to 17) increased only 35 percent. One million children were arrested last year.

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## The Imbalance of Terror

is the policy of might makes fright. And fright, Khrushchev must hope, will paralyze Western nerves. Insofar as his decision was based on military expediency, it may be construed as a sign of felt weakness. It indicates that the Soviets were not conducting any clandestine tests during the moratorium, and that they were not confident of their ability to conceal tests they wished to conduct, either because they had not perfected underground techniques or because the information they seek requires above-ground testing.

If, as we surmise, the Soviet military had doubts about the reliability of their missile warheads, it would be natural for them to have put great pressure on the Kremlin to make absolutely sure existing weapons work, to test them before the Berlin crisis brings the Soviet Union closer to the brink of war. If this was not the case, it would be hard to conceive a military imperative that would prevent the Soviets from awaiting what appeared to be an imminent, and unpopular, decision by the US to break the moratorium first. Hundred-megaton bombs are certainly not militarily essential and are no great trick for either side to construct. The Russians have all the destructive nuclear power and the thrust to deliver that power that savage retaliation would require. It is doubtful, moreover, whether Soviet development of an anti-ICBM has advanced to the point where nuclear tests are critical; nor have the Russians yet indicated an interest in developing the kinds of small, mobile missiles on which the West expects to rely in a few years. While Soviet generals and scientists might have a long-range interest in testing to develop an anti-missile missile or a warhead for a small missile, or to explore weapons' effects, only the need to test the warhead for currently operational Soviet missiles could, in our judgment, have provided a strong enough military incentive to invite world opprobrium by testing at this time.

There is, it should be said, another opinion on this matter, according to which the recent Russian explosions are designed not to test currently operational warheads but to develop other and more efficient ones. Dr. Ralph Lapp, for example, believes that, "Generals in the USSR must have viewed their fixed ICBM bases as highly vulnerable to a US first strike or pre-emptive attack. To redress this loss of security there must have arisen a strong military demand for solid fuel, mobile, ballistic missiles of intercontinental range." Possibly such a demand explains the test resumption. One cannot be certain, and by now all of us should be duly skeptical in assessing Soviet motives.

While there might have been some gain from a choice by the Kennedy Administration unilaterally to continue the test moratorium indefinitely, the pressures to do otherwise were probably too great to

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resist. But since there are profound moral, not to mention health, aspects to testing in the atmosphere, the President's decision to confine US tests to the underground and the laboratory is wise. For this government to match Soviet belligerence – test for test – would neither improve our bargaining position in the negotiations to come or enhance whatever future hopes there may be for an abatement of the nuclear arms race. The resumption of testing has been forced on us, and we should stress this rather than argue the benefits of testing to our side.

Mr. Khrushchev has often spoken of Soviet determination to "catch up" with the United States. This has usually been thought to refer to "catching up" in consumer goods – in the production of cars, crops, homes or highways. The decision to resume testing means he intends to "catch up" with what, until recently, has been the declared military policy of the US – massive deterrence. But with a difference. Washington had heretofore assumed that the threat of massive retaliation would deter the Communists from nibbling. Mr. Khrushchev appears to think that by similar threats he can deter us from interfering with that nibbling. Both assumptions are proving unreliable, just as the "balance of terror" is proving to be made up of more terror than balance.

# De Gaulle's Olive Branch

The Algerian War, with its long sequence of tragic paradox, may soon have a suitably ironic ending. For conceivably the new Premier of the Algerian Provisional Government, ben Youssef ben Khedda, head of the Algerian delegation to Peking in 1959 and outspoken advocate of cooperation with the East, may be able to reach the meeting of minds with Charles de Gaulle which his predecessor, the more tractable moderate, Ferhat Abbas, was unable to achieve during three sets of unproductive peace talks.

The original organizers of the FLN, who rejected direct help from both Moscow and Peking, and who were willing to accept peace terms from France short of complete independence and full control over the Sahara, proved unable to arrange a cease-fire even with a "liberal" French Government. French elements aborted the 1956 peace plans by capturing five Algerian *chefs* who were en route to negotiate a truce with representatives of Socialist Premier Mollett. This *coup de force* and the numerous rebuffs by subsequent French governments, including de Gaulle's cavalier treatment of the Algerians at the Melun talks last year, had the effect of stiffening the FLN. At the same time, the mere continuation of the war progressively altered the composition of the rebel organization – filling it with young people who lack emotional attachment to France, who tend to equate the "West" with "colonialism," and who are attracted by the revolutionary dynamism and friendly attitude of the Communist countries, particularly China. As a result the FLN began demanding what amounted to unconditional surrender, and the talks held at Evian-les-Bains in May and June and at Lugrin in July foundered.

The major obstacle to *rapport* on both occasions was the question of who should have sovereignty over the wealth-laden Sahara. Though willing to grant self-determination to Algeria's northern departments, the French held that the Saharan territories had always been administered separately, and hence should remain French – though profits from an estimated 1,450 million tons of oil, 2 trillion cubic meters of natural gas and other mineral resources could be shared in some manner with the African states – including Algeria – which border the desert. The Algerians countered by stating that France had given the Sahara a distinctly separate status only after the discovery of oil and gas in 1956. They pointed out that maps and other documents always showed the Sahara as part of Algeria and protested that it would be unthinkable to deprive their country of "four-fifths of its territory" – and its major potential source of income. Their African neighbors might receive some slivers of territory or benefits from the development of resources, but all arrangements would have to be made with the government of independent Algeria. De Gaulle, beset by a farmers' revolt and fearful of another military *coup*, apparently felt unable to yield at all in July. The Algerians, tacitly if somewhat begrudgingly supported by the African border states, stuck firmly to their demands, left Lugrin in a huff, and proceeded to reorganize their government under a man who was willing to renew the

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war – with Communist Chinese help if necessary.

After the period of rumored revolt had passed quietly, the French Government indicated that it would surrender sovereignty over the Sahara provided that its economic interests were protected. Ben Khedda officially ignored this overture but hinted at a general willingness to resume negotiations. And in a private conversation with an American official in Tunis at the end of August, the hard-nosed Vice Premier, Belkacem Krim, explained that his government realized the Saharan oil would be useless to independent Algeria unless it could be marketed, and that it wished to arrange this with France and the Common Market. He also pointed out that the FLN had just chosen a Foreign Minister for whom the French had shown a great deal of respect during previous negotiations. At his press conference on September 5, de Gaulle admitted that no Algerian could accept less than full sovereignty over the Sahara, and in effect promised to concede this if Algeria would negotiate accords on exploitation of its wealth and other aspects of "association."

That de Gaulle offered this olive branch indicated a desire to arrange peace on a realistic basis as soon as possible. Ben Khedda and his associates, anxious to begin running a real Algerian Government, therefore appear to be in a good position to profit from new negotiations centering on a formula for developing and selling Saharan oil and gas. It remains to be seen whether they will compromise on such matters as the naval base at Mers el Kebir and the status of the one million Frenchmen in Algeria.

# Foreign Aid Director

In his reported selection of George D. Woods to head the newly-reorganized foreign economic aid agency, the President has chosen a man of vision and competence. Mr. Woods is one of a handful of business leaders who more than a decade ago recognized the importance of the underdeveloped countries and began then working with quiet effect to marshal support in the right places for the aid program. As chairman of the First Boston Corporation he has been well-situated to help key countries – notably India – attract private US capital and technology. But he has unequivocally supported the public as well as the private side of development. The Friends of India Committee, recently established at Mr. Woods' initiative, praises India's "democratic union of private and public effort" and specifically approves the Indian Government's reserving "to itself the right of primacy in creating the basic industries from which the whole community will benefit in equal measure" – iron and steel included. Mr. Woods is a Republican and a "Wall Streeter" whose views on many domestic US economic issues are frankly Republican. What matters in this case is that he does not apply the US yardstick to quite different conditions abroad. And to the extent that he favors US support for private entrepreneurship in the underdeveloped countries, he has favored helping modern, investment-minded newcomers as against the entrenched monopolistic combinations.

It is thus hard to sympathize with the attitude of Clyde Ellis, general manager of the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, who has protested the appointment of "any investment banker to this post." Mr. Ellis had been lobbying for the appointment of someone from the cooperative movement to head the agency and has sought to smear Woods by recalling the role of First Boston (and thus indirectly of Mr. Woods) in the Dixon-Yates affair. Though no evidence has been offered that Mr. Woods was guilty of shady behavior, the mere mention of Dixon-Yates arouses certain Senatorial emotions.

Mr. Woods would in our view bring intelligence and decisiveness to the job, as well as contributing to the aid program's over-all appeal in Congress.

# Notice to Broadcasters

The National Association of Broadcasters has disclosed that the "typical" television station made a net profit in the recession year of 1960 of $139,200, or 15.5 percent on a gross revenue of $904,500. This earning was made by entrepreneurs exploiting a publicly-owned resource (*i.e.*, the spectrum) which they were allowed to borrow only because they made certain promises in their loan applications regarding the service they would render its owners as payment for its use.

Apparently some part of this profit resulted from the fact that not all the borrowers kept their word. As evidence, the FCC by unanimous vote recently refused to grant a standard three-year license renewal to KORD, Pasco, Washington, and instead placed it on what amounts to a year's probation for broadcasting an average of 1,631 commercials per week, as against a promise of only 700 in its license application.

The fate of station KORD is relatively unimportant. What is important is that a copy of the Commission's decision was sent to every AM, FM and TV licensee. In this document the Commissioners stressed that they could have revoked KORD's license, but didn't go this far, only because they didn't want any one station to claim it had been the victim of a Commission "ambush." Receipt of this decision, however, places every station on notice from now on that a licensee can no longer assume he is entitled to an automatic grace period in which he may "disregard his original pro-



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gramming proposals in the hope that he will be permitted to 'upgrade' these when called to account." A broadcaster is expected "to be responsive to the changing needs of his community," and where the record shows gross disregard of promises, it is the licensee who bears the "burden of demonstrating just why his community has less need for such public service programming than he originally proposed."

The real test will come when a station now on notice – as all now are, that gross disregard of program promises will no longer be tolerated – continues its defiant practices and the Commission is forced either to vote against any renewal, or have its bluff called.

# Wave of the Past

One year ago the Young Americans for Freedom uttered its birth cry – limited government, private enterprise and the repudiation of Square, New and Fair Deals whose banners, said these radicals of the Right, now attract "only the diehards, the misinformed and the blind." Sympathetic editors puffed this rhetoric into what one newsmagazine called a "conservative wave." Barry Goldwater, the patron saint of YAF, soon sighted "a tidal wave . . . sweeping the nation's colleges." Last month, in Madison, Wis., the breaker turned out to be froth.

Weeks before the 14th annual congress of the National Student Association, a confederation of nearly 400 student governments, YAF leaders charged that an "isolated elite" was running the NSA for its own "far-left" purposes and promised a "powerful, region-by-region coalition" to push through rightist resolutions and a "walkout of member colleges" if their resolutions failed.

When the lines were drawn, YAF was laughed off the field. Relying largely on adult spokesmen – William F. Buckley, Jr. and Fulton Lewis III (formerly of the House Committee on Un-American Activities), YAF members themselves kept in corners with their rented walkie-talkies, relaying what intelligence they mustered to an "isolated elite" in a nearby hotel.

Meanwhile, in a public meeting, Buckley referred to "Lumumba and Mobutu and the semi-savages," drawing boos and the ire of a Negro vice president of NSA, who replied that Buckley had a "slave-owning mentality." In a debate on HUAC (for whose abolition the delegates later voted), "Buddy" Lewis delivered what was considered a flimsy defense of his former employers. And at a third meeting, YAF gave the platform to Congressman John Rousselot (R, Calif.), who urged students to join him in the John Birch Society. The first of these incidents brought indignation, the second contempt and the third amusement.

# New York Votes Reform

There is no exact historical precedent for Mayor Robert F. Wagner's astonishing turnabout in New York City in which he first repudiated the "bosses" who put him in office eight years ago and then overcame their united opposition to win renomination for a third term. But there is a Mort Sahl phrase that fits: "It's like Steve Canyon getting rid of Milton Caniff."

In the early 1950's, Tammany Leader Carmine De Sapio had two ambitious but not especially capable second-generation Democrats on his hands: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., and Robert F. Wagner, Jr. He sponsored Wagner, nominating him for Mayor in 1953 against incumbent Vincent Impellitteri over the objections of the Brooklyn organization, and helping elect him that fall and again in 1957. With equal nonchalance, he broke young Roosevelt's career in 1954 by denying him the gubernatorial nomination and assisting his defeat for state attorney general.

For seven years Wagner, De Sapio and the Bronx and Brooklyn "bosses" Charles Buckley and Joseph Sharkey ran New York City and its Democratic Party. But De Sapio's personal position was weakened steadily from 1958 on, first by Averell Harriman's loss of the governorship, later by the encroachments of the Manhattan "reform" Democrats led by ex-Senator Lehman and Eleanor Roosevelt, and most recently by the open hostility of the Kennedys, who refused to yield patronage to him or his ally, State Chairman Michael H. Prendergast. Never in these years did Wagner move against him.

Last winter, however, facing a third term campaign with his personal prestige reduced to the vanishing point by a succession of horrendous scandals – 38 major ones, by semi-official count – in the police, school, housing, welfare, traffic, transit and other city departments, Mayor Wagner heeded the threats of the "reform" Democrats and Liberal Party leaders and denounced De Sapio. This was hailed as an act of rare political courage by Senator Lehman, who then, after suppressing the protests of younger "reform" leaders, who had spent the better part of four years publicizing Mayor Wagner's inadequacies, managed to swing the bulk of the "reform" strength behind the Mayor.

Even then, and in fact up until July 4, Wagner continued to negotiate with "bosses" Buckley and Sharkey for their support. When these negotiations failed to produce agreement on the makeup of the City Hall slate, the "bosses" summoned State Controller Arthur Levitt from his honorable obscurity in Albany and commanded him to run for Mayor, and Wagner, to his astonishment, found himself bucking the combined power of all five borough organizations.

"Smash Bossism," the Wagner posters proclaimed.



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"End Wagnola," the Tammany buttons demanded. Adam Clayton Powell, backing the machine, even managed to charge Wagner with racial discrimination.

From the start, Wagner had much the better of the campaign. Levitt showed a deep distaste for personal invective. When Wagner pressed his attack on De Sapio and the other "bosses," they replied in anger, without bothering to consult their candidate. It took no genius to guess that if Levitt could not control his own headquarters during the campaign he could hardly be expected to run the grafters out of City Hall.

Nonetheless, the extent of Wagner's victory was a surprise. He won by a 3-2 margin, carrying all five boroughs. Reform candidates in Manhattan, who had feared that Wagner would be a drag, won more races than they expected.

The primary produced three immediate results:

1. The "reform" Democrats toppled their chief target, De Sapio. He lost his district leadership in Greenwich Village to "reform" candidate James S. Lanigan, and with it his eligibility to continue as head of Tammany Hall. His political power is finished. But as Lanigan points out, the fight to take over the Party machinery has just begun and may take as long as five years to win.

2. Wagner has now become the principal Democratic power in New York City and probably in the whole state. He can name his own man as head of Tammany (presumably someone acceptable to the "reformers") and exert substantial influence in the Bronx and Brooklyn organizations, even if he cannot immediately replace Buckley and Sharkey. He will have the backing of the Kennedy Administration and enjoy its support, through patronage, in his efforts to prepare the state organization for the 1962 campaign against Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller.

3. Rockefeller's long-shot hope of enhancing his own prestige by electing State Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz (R) as Mayor of New York now seems rather remote.

There are still two sources of concern for the Democratic Party strategists, however. The first and seemingly less substantial problem is the general election this fall. Wagner should win, but no one knows what undisclosed information on the Wagner administration is in the hands of Rockefeller's State Investigation Commission. Revelation of a new city scandal could set the stage for a strong protest vote or even a Lefkowitz victory.

The second and currently more serious worry is Wagner himself. If he wins big in November and sets to work improving affairs in the city, he is the logical man to run for Governor in 1962. The Kennedys are desperate for someone who can hold Rockefeller to a margin of a half-million votes, if not defeat him, and would go all-out on Wagner's behalf if he shows that potential. But Wagner is drab and has a history of muffing his big chances.

## MR. KHRUSHCHEV HAS SHAKEN THE BRITISH PUBLIC

# Bombshell on the Highlands

*Glasgow, Scotland*

Until the nuclear rumblings from Semipalatinsk were picked up, British opinion was still reacting sluggishly to the Berlin crisis. It was not encouraged to do anything else. Mr. Macmillan, golfing here in Scotland, paused at Gleneagles' 18th green to reassure the small but persevering press corps that war was virtually the last thing on his mind. He had been struck only by the news that Mr. K was golfing, too, in the Crimea. The heroics of Lyndon Johnson's relief of West Berlin with ball-point pens seemed far away that gentle, Victorian Saturday. Outside London (and Macmillan and Lord Home were commuting only infrequently and reluctantly to Whitehall as the crisis developed) the common view has been, and still is, that the Russians will not start anything as daft (a censorious Scotticism) as a nuclear or even a conventional war. If the Soviet trade fair at Earl's Court this summer left any impression on the British consciousness it was to confirm the idea, repeated on all sides now, that the Russians who are so proud of their new society have as much to lose as anybody from nuclear bombardment. Even Khrushchev's challenge to the Western air routes to Berlin was at first shrugged off either as a bargaining point for the inevitable talks or an attempt to distract attention from Herr Ulbricht's humiliation.

The Russian resumption of tests fell therefore as much more of a bombshell on the Highlands than it may have done, say, in the Elysée Palace. This was not



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the picture of the rational and potentially liberal Tsar which had persisted in Britain after the Paris summit of 1960 because it was what everyone had hankered after. The crisis was on. Mr. Macmillan returned, temporarily, to London. Great emphasis was placed on Nehru's critical comments on Soviet policy at Belgrade. Official opinion expressed its profound shock through the pronouncement by Lord Gladwyn (previously Gladwyn Jebb) that "the Russians have now, for the first time, I believe, since the Revolution formally broken their pledged word and thus fatally damaged their credit." It is what Labour men on Clydeside have been saying in their own way too. The right-wing leadership of the Trades Union Congress (having, incidentally, flung out the Communist-dominated Electrical Trades Union) found it easier than expected to carry the moderate Gaitskellite line on American nuclear bases in Britain. For the first time, too, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament went round to the Soviet embassy, to be granted an argumentative hearing by Ambassador Soldatov. The later announcement that American tests would also be resumed was no surprise, but the blurring of Mr. K's culpability is openly regretted.

The effect of the Russian challenge, then, has been the reverse of pushing Britain into a separate, appeasing initiative for talks on Berlin, although the fundamental conviction is still that eventual negotiations are not any less desirable than they were. Although Macmillan has been under Labour pressure all summer to get matters under way, the Foreign Office is adamant that there can be no independent move, like the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow in the last crisis in 1959. The government intends to keep in step with Washington. This British self effacement is not entirely voluntary. After all, Macmillan knows that he has to talk to de Gaulle and Adenauer this fall about joining the European Economic Community. And the indications from Moscow all year have been that a separate British initiative, while useful in disrupting the Western front, would not be taken seriously by Khrushchev as a means of settling the Berlin problem itself.

The British argument for negotiation is twofold. Immediately, it is felt that the Western military position in West Berlin is so precarious that delay can only weaken such advantages (particularly the morale of the population) that the West is still assumed to possess. Secondly, it is only by negotiation that the West can hope to broaden the Berlin issue to encompass German reunification: to bring the Russians to this second stage in the discussion there is a greater willingness to look again at Macmillan's old idea, which was pushed aside at West German insistence after he returned from Moscow in 1959, of arms control in central Europe generally. This seems a more promising approach than some of the rather desperate ideas going the rounds, including one (which the Liberals are canvassing) to shift the United Nations *en bloc* from New York to West Berlin – although Foreign Office officials do not object to the concept of some UN presence there as a further guarantee of access from West Germany.

But the basic question is, of course, whether Khrushchev, as he is now placed, is amenable to reasonable discussion, or whether, as the Yugoslavs have been hinting at Belgrade, it is a military clique that is calling the tune in Moscow. If the hard-line group has really won in Moscow then there is much more to be said for de Gaulle's policy – or rather, it is felt, there would be more to be said were NATO capable of conducting more than a token conventional resistance to a full-scale Russian push across the Elbe. Since any immediate US or British reinforcement for General Norstad could be doubled or trebled by the Red Army – merely increasing the existing disparity of forces – this is not regarded in London as a present way out of West Berlin's predicament.

There is no blinking the fact that West Berlin is less than a popular symbol in Britain. On the Left (and on the nationalistic Right) there is an evident satisfaction, not far below the surface, that Germany is divided: the hope up to now has been that ordinary life in East Germany would jog along in increasing approximation to the Polish variety of semi-freedom.

To a good many people here it was not unnatural of Herr Ulbricht to cordon off the highly-subsidized capitalist shopwindow that West Berlin had become. There has been a feeling that certain West German activities in the city were unnecessarily provocative; and there is a reluctance to be dragged into war because West Berlin demonstrators may now get out of hand or because some people in Bonn may wish to trigger off an East German revolt. The most tactless remark that Herr Brandt could make was to talk of another Munich. Chancellor Adenauer, simply because he has lain low, has risen in British estimations: Mr. Macmillan's praise for his cool head has been surprisingly widely echoed.

None of this, however, should be interpreted as proof of any widespread anti-German feeling. The arrival last month of the first West German troops to train in Britain passed off decorously and even warmly. The leftist protest organizers who went down to the training ground at Castlemartin in south Wales got no local backing whatever. The anti-NATO groups have been losing ground steadily since their momentary penetration of Labour Party policy last year; or rather, the true weakness of their hold on mass opinion has been increasingly exposed. The continuing British preference to seek negotiations over Berlin is not therefore based on any switch to neutralism that transatlantic columnists have occasionally claimed to see. As the world looks from London and the Highlands alike, the attempt to talk is based on painful necessity.

ALASTAIR BURNET



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# Chief Humbi, MP

*Dar-es-Salaam*

"Chief Humbi, MP," the tall, thickset African in the white dinner jacket, introduced himself to me at the Speaker of Tanganyika's sundowner. Struck by the close conjunction of titles from the old and new political orders, I inquired whether, as often in Nigerian politics, the chieftainship was honorific. Chief Humbi Ziota II, MBE, MLC (Member of the Legislative Council), to give his full style, explained that to the contrary he was the hereditary chief justice and principal administrator of the Usongo in the Nzega District – Usongo constituting about a third of the cattle-raising Bassongo tribe. As the guests, headed by the Colonial Secretary and the Chief Minister, celebrating a successful constitutional conference, filed past the Speaker and departed, my new companion ushered me into a huge American car. "An African millionaire," I silently reflected, whereupon the chief, as if reading my thoughts, observed defensively that he had picked his car up very cheaply (and it needed to be big, as I was later to find out). He drove it gingerly, as if handling a piece of priceless jade, to my hotel and at my invitation joined me for a nightcap on the patio.

"How does a political party fit in with a traditional tribal organization?" I asked, for Chief Humbi, like all successful politicians in Tanganyika, is a member of Mr. Julius Nyerere's Tanu (Tanganyika African National Union) Party. "With advanced tribes like the Chagga the party is rapidly replacing the tribe and creating loyalties that are wider than the tribe," he replied, "but my people are very backward and would not understand anybody except the chief speaking for them, so, when they had to choose an MP, they said to me, 'You better go and represent us'; I asked Julius Nyerere whether I should do it and he said I should." I asked him, since he spoke so often of the backwardness of his tribe and the squalor of its living conditions, how he had come by his own obviously excellent education. He said it had been the policy of the British to pick out the heirs of chiefs and have them properly educated. ("Sometimes we wasted thousands of pounds on a dud, but generally speaking we are rather proud of the way we picked future winners," a civil servant observed when I commented on this foresighted policy.)

Humbi himself was a graduate of Makerere, the excellent East African university-college at Kampala, in Uganda, and had been sent to England three times by the government, to study local government in Yorkshire, agricultural methods in Berkshire, and means of combating soil erosion (for which he had also gone to Cyprus). During one of these visits he had spent three months as the guest of an anthropologist in Oxford. It would not be hard to picture his academic host's enthusiasm, for Chief Humbi, MP is a personal bridge between the African's two worlds, being equally articulate in portraying either.

I asked him the question which has troubled many outsiders: whether his people were really going to be happier when they were Westernized than they are now with the old ways and customary relationships. He spoke in practical terms of the Bassongo's poor nutrition and wasting diseases and the malign influence of witch doctors. "Their cattle urinate in the same place from which they draw their water supply," he said simply. I suggested that perhaps a little chlorine might help. The chief sighed. "They are very suspicious," he said, "of white man's magic. They think that chlorine would poison the water." (I couldn't help thinking as he spoke of the immense fuss created in parts of England and the United States whenever it is proposed to fluoridate the water supply to protect children's teeth.)

Chief Humbi said that one recent milestone of progress was the distribution of powdered milk by the World Health Organization. He mimicked his simple Africans with their rolling eyes as they took the white powder on their forefinger, like snuff, and ran it quizzically under their nostrils. "Did this come from European nurse?" they would ask suspiciously. If it did there would be more hurdles of conservatism to cross. If it came "from African nurse" progress was one step forward. But in one or two villages it fell back again since sooner or later the strange powder was bound to be given to a baby who was sick anyway. Once it vomited, the entire consignment of powdered milk would be cast away. The chief observed philosophically they had often suffered from bouts of malaria and dysentery as part of the price of passing between his two worlds. Many of his people were immunized by long exposure to the ravages of unsanitary water supplies. Humbi himself used a water filter at his home but he could not very well take it with him as he circulated in his territory, hearing appeals from the courts of his sub-chiefs and settling matrimonial questions and land boundaries. Since he had been away for as much as a year at a time at the university or in England he would be especially vulnerable when he returned.

The chief's special preoccupation was the fighting of



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soil erosion, from which his tribe suffered severely. Their feckless, extensive farming was creating a dust bowl which was consuming the grazing ground of their 250,000 heads of cattle. For two years Humbi had been Assistant Minister for Natural Resources in the Tanganyika Government, while his brother had carried out his duties as chief and then had tried to spread his campaign for the conservation he had studied in Cyprus across the breadth of the whole territory. But "the African is lazy," said the chief firmly but dispassionately, "he will not do anything unless he can see the results at once. He only expects to work five months of the year, when the rains come. Ask him to dig terraces along the contours and plant grass and trees to keep back the desert and he will say (again the rolling eyes), 'But that will mean work and how do I know what will happen in two or three years' time?' "

Chief Humbi, MP, speaks affectionately of his wayward people and, being himself only 38, feels confident of being able to bring them ahead through encouraging the younger generation. He knows that only the chief can do it, so that he rations his escapes to the Western world where he feels most at home, that Western world represented at Dar-es-Salaam by the Speaker's sundowner, the caucuses of the Tanu Party, and the fulfilled shouts of "*Uhuru* (Independence) 1961" in the streets of the capital.

Prompted by allusions to "my wives and children" I inquired whether polygamy was the way of his tribe. "Yes, I have two wives," he replied. "I have to as chief, you know, and the tribe keeps wanting me to have more." He explained that there were certain clans from which chiefs' wives traditionally came. When he had succeeded his uncle in the chieftaincy, Humbi Ziota II had been presented with three wives by the elders of the tribe, who had paid the dowries for him. By tradition the senior wife was one of the wives of his predecessor – in this case his aunt by marriage. He did not have much choice over the other two, though I gathered that within limits he was able to express a preference.

In 1951, on his return from one of his trips abroad, the chief divorced two of his three wives and married a younger girl who was somewhat more of a personal selection, though still from a proper clan. Either husband or wife can divorce the other simply by saying, "I don't love you any more," but to get the dowry refunded a husband must satisfy his ex-wife's clan that she has somehow let him down. Since in a chief's case the elders have provided the dowry, he is in no position to waive this proceeding. "It is very hard on a woman who has been married for 15 years," said the chief-MP with some feeling, thinking doubtless of his ex-senior wife, "she is not young any more, she has to pay back her dowry, and she goes back to her clan without any money." "You keep the children, I presume." "Oh, yes." "And is there no alimony of any sort?" "If the wife has given birth to a son, she gets a bull, and if to a daughter a cow."

I asked my companion whether, when he had Westernized his tribe, he would favor the institution of monogamy. (I had in the back of my mind a remark by the Mayor of Dar-es-Salaam, who happens also to be a Muslim missionary. He was convinced that once the British had left, many Christians would turn over to Islam because it conformed more completely with such natural African practices as polygamy.) "Yes," said Humbi Ziota II warmly, "polygamy is far too expensive. I have two wives and they want me to have more but this means so many children and I can't afford them. I have 10 already, and when I come back with a Western gift like a jumper for one of my girls I have to bring them for all." "Now I know why you have such a large car," I said, "you must have room to pack them all in." "Yes, indeed," said the chief-MP with a sigh. "The government have been very good to me. They have built me two houses but they are both very noisy with wives and children all over the place."

Then there was the question of education. Chief Humbi, MP, was determined that all 10 children should receive a modern education, culminating with a period in Britain. His eldest son, of whom he was particularly proud, was showing great promise as a mathematician and he wanted him to be an engineer to help build the new independent Tanganyika. "But doesn't he have to be trained to be a chief?" I asked. With quiet pride Chief Humbi replied that provided he himself lived a normal life span he hoped to be the last chief of his line. With any luck he would have worked himself out of a job by Westernizing his tribe and would have abolished the chieftainship within 15 years.

KEITH KYLE

COMING

*Immediately following the West German elections,* The New Republic *will devote a special issue to Berlin and the future of American policy in Central Europe.*

*Contributors will include Louis J. Halle, Gerald Freund, Lennart Hirschfeldt, Terence Prittie, Sidney Hyman, Brigadier-General Thomas R. Phillips, Morton Halperin, David Riesman and Joseph W. Bishop, Jr.*



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# If a Man Has It

Arthur Krock asserts flatly that the defeat of the Administration school bill was due, at least in large part, to the fact that Kennedy wobbled at the critical moment. At the start he declared unequivocally that any appropriation of public money to sectarian or other private schools would be unconstitutional; but when the bishops threatened that in that case there would be no school bill, some of the President's advisers began to waver and were not rebuked by him. There was talk of long-term loans and fringe benefits to church schools. There were hints that the President was really not too far from the bishops' position.

It is irrelevant to point out that the President himself did not indulge in any such talk. Persons close to him did, and he did not shut them up. Therefore his originally clear position became clouded.

The fatality of this is due to a fact that some Presidential advisers seem incapable of grasping. This is the fact that a considerable number of Protestants also take their religion seriously. These are watching with hawk-like vigilance for the first sign that the Administration is dominated by the Catholic hierarchy, and they demand that Congress exercise the same vigilance.

Therefore a good many Democrats, especially the Southerners, dared not take the risk of voting for the school bill. Since the Supreme Court anti-segregation decisions of 1954 the South has been abnormally sensitive about federal influence on local schools. This makes it dangerous for any Southern Congressman to support any federal school bill, even one that seems to be financially advantageous; add, then, the slightest suspicion that some impairment of the policy of separation of Church and State lurks in the bill, and the risk becomes too great. Party loyalty has its limits. If following the President means that a Congressman is going to lose his seat, only those cast in the heroic mould will stick.

No doubt all members of Congress ought to be heroes, but the fact remains that they are not. Furthermore, there is a genuine difference of opinion as to who is the hero. To a great many minds, the Congressman who boldly defends separation of Church and State, even against the leader of his own party, is the one cast in the heroic mould.

Unfortunately, some of the President's advisers seem to cling to the fatuous theory that the way to deal with religious prejudice is to ignore it, and it will soon go away. But it will not do so. The only way to defeat it is to prove, not by argument but by deeds, that there is no factual basis for its existence. That Kennedy seemed about to do when he branded as unconstitutional any scheme to turn over public money to private schools; but the double-talk of his friends raised doubt that he meant what he said.

It is true that this factor would not have been decisive had there not been powerful forces already arrayed against the school bill. Nevertheless it exists, and it should be taken into account in every hot contest in which a feather's weight on either side may turn the scale. It is by winning just such contests that a President's prestige is established; and it is by losing them that the situation may get completely out of hand and Presidential leadership lost as completely as it was lost during the Eisenhower Administration.

However, we are still in the first quarter of the Administration. Mr. Kennedy has yet another session of the Democratic Congress elected with him, and one session is ample time in which to demonstrate effective leadership, if a man has it. Mr. Kennedy is reputed to be a fast learner, and in his first year he has been put through a rigorous school. It may be that he has mastered the technique of his job to an extent that will astonish the country when Congress reassembles.

At least he has needled Khrushchev into making two blunders so egregious that they overshadow the lamentable Castro adventure. The closing of the Berlin border and the explosion of a nuclear bomb together have had the effect of throwing the Belgrade conference, if not quite into the arms of the United States, at least into a really neutral position. The prompt announcement by England and the US that we would not be stampeded into instant resumption of the poisonous atmospheric tests suggested an awareness of the high importance of keeping the Russians on the defensive.

Success in this would retrieve anything that Castro and Congress may have cost the President; but success will not be achieved by ignoring the existing facts, even such as we deplore and think ought not to exist.

At home and abroad, Kennedy is fortunate in his enemies. Nixon's gross violation of good taste in a Washington bar, where he criticized sending US troops to Berlin, has made the mannerly thank God it is Kennedy who is in the White House.



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# Good Intentions in Iran

*by Walter Z. Laqueur*

Some 250 years ago Usbek, the hero of Montesquieu's *Lettres Persanes,* discussing the political situation in Teheran, advised his friend Ibben that "authority can never be equally divided between the people and the prince. It is difficult to maintain an equilibrium; power must diminish on one side while it increases on the other; but the advantage is usually with the prince as he commands the army." Looking at the prospect in Iran today, one feels strongly inclined to subscribe to Usbek's judgment – though one cannot feel so sure about the prince's hold on the military forces.

At this moment the Middle Eastern situation is of course overshadowed by events in Central Europe. But I am fairly certain that once the Berlin crisis has been resolved in one way or another there will be a major Middle Eastern crisis. And probably over Persia. For while, politically speaking, the situation in Europe is frozen and no basic change of the *status quo* is possible without a war, this is not so in the Middle East (and Africa and Latin America). Next year the Russians seem most likely to try their luck in one of the places where they do not run extreme military risks.

There has been a race between reform and revolution in Iran for many years and a few months ago it entered into its decisive phase. Soon after the new Amini government came to power, the minister of agriculture, Arsanjani, told the biggest landowners in no uncertain terms that they had to choose between a voluntary distribution of their land and a "bloody red revolution." Some 15 of them informed the government of their willingness to do so; among them was Mehdi Batmanglieh, who owns an area comparable in size to Switzerland. But most of the "feudals" refused to be shaken by these as all previous warnings. It was just another false alarm as far as they were concerned.

More than half of Iran, or, to be precise, more than half of the arable land, belongs to a handful of landowners; the Sulfugaris, Malek Madinis, Alams, Palisi, *et al,* each of whom possesses at least 300-400 villages. Sixty percent of Persia's peasants, on the other hand, have no land at all, and 22 percent have to make ends meet with less than one hectare (2.5 acres). For the last 10 years some efforts have been made to put an end to this polarization of land ownership with its fatal social and political consequences – mainly following the initiative of the Shah, a few Teheran "reformists" and well-meaning foreign observers. But the results have been disappointing: Only about 20,000 families have actually received land as the result of these reforms.

The Amini government intends to distribute among landless peasants the so-called *chalese,* the land belonging to the state, about four percent of the total. It has also tried to establish agricultural cooperatives in the villages. But success or failure will ultimately depend on its ability to persuade or to compel the big landowners to give up most of their holdings. The prospects are not exactly rosy; the majority of this class does everything in its power to overthrow the Amini government by fair means (appealing to the courts against nationalization) and foul. Some of the biggest landowners have their private armies and their sword is still law in much of the Persian countryside.

In other fields the Amini government has been somewhat more successful in its attempts to take the wind out of the sails of the opposition, constituted by the followers of Dr. Mossadegh (the "National Front") and the Communists. It made the leader of the teachers' trade union, Darakshesh, minister of education; teachers, as well as students belong in Persia to the most militantly oppositionist elements, and the government preceding Amini's was in effect overthrown by a teachers' strike. Amini increased teachers' salaries and thus gained the sympathies of many members of this scandalously underpaid profession. But he antagonized some by dismissing a fairly large number of officials in the ministry of education and by sending others to teach in the villages. Inquiries carried out on the initiative of the next minister showed (not altogether surprisingly) widespread corruption in the Persian universities: Two schools had to be closed because it was found that they had sold academic titles. Some professors and heads of departments had rented their houses to the universities as laboratories and libraries at fantastic prices. Amini also discontinued the stipends of several thousand students abroad: Some of them were mere playboys, sons of rich parents, who had followed their studies in such unlikely places as Monte Carlo and Biarritz while others were, in effect, professional politicians. Some of them have returned and will undoubtedly join the oppositionist camp. The repercussions of these measures may well be of great importance in view of the great role played by these strata in Persian politics.

Above all, the Amini government has tried to take

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strict measures against corruption and embezzlement in public life. The prosecutors general and the officials of the Ministry of Justice started to work overtime for the first time in living memory but only after a first purge had been carried out in their own ranks and after the minister had dissolved certain courts of justice. In a country in which corrupt practices have been prevalent from times immemorial it is not easy to make a fresh start and Amini has been charged by some critics with not going far enough in trying to eradicate this scourge. He was accused, in particular, of not bringing to trial former Prime Ministers such as Eqhbal, a physician and former head of Teheran University, who has been the *bête noire* of the opposition for many years. But many pillars of the Persian establishment have disappeared from the capital including most of the leaders of *Melliyun*, the former government party; they have gone abroad or retired to their villages to await better days.

The main demand of the opposition was for new elections. But Amini refused to be hurried, though everyone, including the Shah and the Prime Minister, agree that the results of the last general elections had been falsified. The opposition tried to bring pressure on the government by street demonstrations and in various other ways (in May, and again on July 21) without any immediate success. Amini wisely tried to prevent a head-on clash with Dr. Mossadegh's supporters and promised new general elections, but not until changes had been carried out in the deficient election laws. Some oppositionist leaders have demanded that the vote should be limited to literate citizens, not an unreasonable demand apparently because the illiterate vote has on past occasions always been the mainstay of the big landowners. But could one really exclude 80 percent of the population from taking part?

These and other questions were discussed for many weeks in the Teheran newspapers. Until recently the Iranian press has been utterly conformist; no criticism of the Shah, the government of the day and its policies were allowed. With the recent crisis and the coming to power of the Amini government the situation radically changed; years of censorship and suppression naturally led toward abuses of the new freedom. A great part of the Teheran press is now anti-government and neutralist and generally speaking anti-everything, which, of course, is its perfect right; it has also shown frequently an utter lack of responsibility by publishing the wildest rumors even if fully aware that these were unsubstantiated and untruthful reports. Such practices contributed very much to the exacerbation of an already explosive situation and the government saw itself compelled to ban briefly several big papers, such as *Keyhan*. The conflict was handled very ineptly but it is difficult to see how the government could have refrained altogether from applying restrictive measures.

Opposing the Amini government, the Communists, the "National Front" and some reactionary right-wing elements have temporarily entered an uneasy alliance. Right-wing politicians such as Tabatabai and Sardar Fakhr Himat have come out in favor of a neutralist foreign policy. These circles are afraid, not indeed without good reason, that close cooperation with the West will inevitably lead toward agrarian reform as well as other restrictions of their old privileges. Their ideal is neighboring Afghanistan, a country where a small group of reactionary "feudals" has indeed managed for a number of years to combine a pro-Soviet foreign line with a thoroughly reactionary policy at home, thus perpetuating, for the time being at any rate, their absolute rule. Such a suicidal mixture would hardly work for long in

## *Diffusing the Responsibility*

We are conducting what is in essence a holding operation to enable the Shah's government to remain politically aligned with the anti-Soviet alliance. The Soviet Union's reply is two-pronged. On the one hand, it is undermining the Shah's government by propaganda and by subversive infiltration. On the other hand, it is tempting the Iranian government to adopt a policy on the Egyptian model, which is to take aid from both sides and to align itself with neither. There is no way of telling when, if ever, there will be a showdown between the Soviet policy and ours. . . . Political developments are hard to foresee in a country where the nation is not surely consolidated behind the government and where the power of the government depends, as it does in Iraq next door, on the inner politics of the army. It would be imprudent, therefore, to be complacent about the prospects. Our government needs to examine the problem closely and with fresh eyes, and not be content to repeat the sing-song of the old policy.

I would begin our re-examination with an hypothesis which, though it is not yet proved, will, when it has been studied and debated, probably turn out to be sound. It is: except as a temporary emergency program, our present bilateral relationship with Iran is undesirable and in the long run unworkable. We are virtually the sole donor country. As such we incur too much responsibility, one which we cannot carry out because we are only advisers and cannot control the Iranian administration. As a result, Iran is too dependent on us, too convinced that its destiny is determined in Washington.

A way will have to be found of diffusing the responsibility and of sharing the burden of solving Iran's economic and social problem.

– Walter Lippmann, *December 15, 1959*



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Iran, but it is clear that it has great fascination for some big Persian landowners.

The motives of most supporters of the "National Front" in opposing the government are more honorable. Most members of Iran's intelligentsia are among them; they have lost hope as the result of many years of stagnation and inactivity, and believe, perhaps rightly, that a radical break with the past is needed to make Iran a modern country, to solve its economic and social problems. They also think that such a break is impossible within the present political framework which has not changed much since Usbek wrote his letters to Ibben and Montesquieu collected them. These circles are opposed to the West and any pro-Western orientation for the simple reason that the Western powers have so far successfully prevented a radical break with the past, propping up tottering governments more than once.

The Iranian Communists, who cannot possibly hope to gain leadership of the opposition in the near future, have therefore called, as the next best thing, for a "National Front" government as the political alternative to the present political set-up. Most leaders of the "National Front" are not pro-Soviet but neutralist; they share the fears of most Persians of the powerful neighbor from the north who more than once has tried to annex parts of Persian territory in recent centuries. They also know that Persia cannot expect very much from the Soviet Union by way of economic help; any such assistance would presumably be offset by Soviet competition in the field of oil exports to the West. Another recent development that has adversely affected the Persian trade balance is the manufacture of Persian-type carpets in Eastern Europe; some years ago Persian technicians were recruited for work in Europe; they ended up in Hungary and Rumania and their machine-made produce is now sold quite cheaply all over Europe.

In view of the scant enthusiasm of the "National Front" for collaboration with the Communists, the latter have tried to split the "National Front." Recently a new group, the "Freedom Movement of Iran," has emerged claiming that it alone has the confidence of Dr. Mossadegh, who, by now a very old and feeble man, still lives in his Ahmedabad exile. This new movement is headed by Bazargan, another Teheran University professor and purports to constitute the *avant garde* of the "National Front" pressing for a more militant anti-government policy. There is much reason to assume that this new group has the blessing of the Communists if it is not directly engineered by them. It remains to be seen in what way the majority of the "National Front" will react to this attempt "to explain certain things to the people in clearer words," as Professor Bazargan has put it.

The Communists need such allies, for their own organization has greatly suffered during the last decade of illegality. Police arrests have hampered their activities which have perhaps even more palpably suffered from the dissension within Communist ranks. The émigré leaders of the Tudeh Party did not see eye to eye with the leadership that remained in Persia, and there were everlasting quarrels within the illegal leadership in Teheran and the provinces. For some years the party ceased in effect to exist as an effective political factor though local Communist bodies continued their activities. Only last autumn a new, and apparently successful attempt was made to unite these groups under a new leadership and, incidentally, a new name ("People's Party of Iran"). It is difficult to assess the strength of the party at present since it is still largely underground; it is generally thought, however, that much as in the case of Turkey (but unlike some Arab countries), local Communists find identification with the USSR in the public image more a curse than a blessing.

These, however, are the Communists' worries; the Iranian Government has enough of its own. Against this opposition from "Left" and "Right" it is compelled to carry out measures that are highly unpopular. In order to save some $50 million the import of foreign luxury goods has been banned. This affects not merely the upper class but also many merchants (and those dependent on them) who are not necessarily well-to-do. In a similar way, the building workers in Teheran, Isfahan and other cities have shown little readiness to follow Amini's advice to return to the villages. There has been much unemployment in these trades of late, but the builders prefer to wait in town for better times; meanwhile they swell the contingent of the discontented willing to demonstrate against the government at the slightest provocation. There has been unrest in the Abadan oil refineries; the workers press for higher wages and the opposition has tabled its old demand for the nationalization of the oil industry. Amini has warned, probably in vain, that the foreign companies would not be averse to closing down Abadan temporarily. There is too much oil in the Middle East anyway and the oil companies' promises to Arab Iraq and Saudi Arabia to increase output there could only be achieved if at the same time Iran's production is reduced.

The present government despite its commendable intentions has no firm mass basis: some would say it is not radical enough, others that it simply needs more demagoguery in its slogans. Few governments in Iran have ever had a mass basis. But then, the present situation is more critical than it has been for a long time. The situation is critical precisely because of Amini's good intentions – a bad political system trying to reform is always extremely vulnerable.

All in all, the prospects for Dr. Amini are not too bright. The alternatives appear to be a reactionary military coup, which could hardly succeed in putting the clock back for any prolonged period, and a "National Front" government.



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# The League of Gracchus Babeuf

*by James Gatsby*

*Moscow*

The Cold War has taken a curious turn here. For, while Moscow regularly beams forth peace and friendship, there now appears to be a significant group of the Russian people who face the "capitalistic world" with bitter enmity. Apparently, the Soviet authorities view this trend with considerable alarm, because recent articles in the government-controlled press, while not coming right out and admitting that there is a sizable, mass opposition movement alive in Russia, have nevertheless dropped a number of broad hints about "certain comrades" who "view international questions from a standpoint of irresponsible adventurism," and who seem to be addicted to "anarchistic tendencies." Also, the government recently ordered a large printing of Lenin's classic *Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder*, in a popularly-priced edition.

The focus of all this hubbub is a semi-secret, grass-roots organization which refers to itself as The League of Gracchus Babeuf. The movement is named after an 18th Century French revolutionary, because it claims that Babeuf was the first Communist to die in "the fight against capitalism." (Babeuf was guillotined in 1797 as the leader of the dread "Conspiracy of the Equals.") The League was supposedly founded several years ago by a retired candy-worker from Leningrad. It has spread all over Russia. Secret "cadres" are in operation in practically all of the major industrial centers, and are beginning to penetrate the rural areas.

Despite the fact that it is illegal, the movement manages to carry its message to a great many Russian workers through surreptitiously-posted "wall newspapers," pamphlets left in conspicuous places and even through small, portable radio transmitters. On top of this the League claims that it is having much success with what it refers to as "capitalistic tactics." As a League educational pamphlet explains, "The capitalists, the monopolists, operate through a wide variety of 'front' organizations, which disguise the naked rule of profit: the Church, the Press, the Universities, Charities, etc. These 'fronts' are the velvet glove which hides the mailed fist of property. Communists, in order to combat the conspiratorial tactics of capitalism, must adopt the very same methods, reprehensible as this may seem."

"I would estimate," the founder of the League is reported to have said, "that about 60 percent of the Russian leaders are capitalists." Premier Khrushchev, according to the League, is a "conscious, dedicated agent of the capitalist conspiracy," and his predecessor, Marshal Stalin, is accused of being "the number-one agent of the Pentagon in Russia." Such accusations may seem ridiculous to a Western reader, but they are taken quite seriously in Russia.

While the government is, of course, relentlessly persecuting the movement, it is in a rather delicate position. How can a revolutionary government persecute men who resolutely affirm the very values on which that government is based? The government *can* persecute them, to be sure, but it is awkward. For one thing, the Russians have just closed down the Siberian forced-labor camps, to their immense pride, and do not wish to open them up again after such a short respite.

Let us examine the origins of the movement. It all began, I am told, in 1955, when the obscure Leningrad candy worker known only as "Comrade X," published the slim volume entitled *The Biography of Gracchus Babeuf*. It is, of course, illegal for anyone to set himself up as a publisher in the Soviet Union, since all means of communication are in the hands of the state. But anyone who can come by a mimeograph machine, hectograph or small, hand-operated printing press and a stapler and paper, and who has sufficient nerve, can certainly "publish" a book. And this is what "Comrade X" did.

Distribution proved somewhat more difficult, but it was accomplished, largely through the black market, which, as in every country where desirable goods are in short supply, flourishes in Russia. It is now possible, I have been told, to buy this book in many Russian bookstores from under-the-counter. After the success of the *Biography*, "Comrade X" was encouraged to plunge into the publishing business full-time. Here are samples of the type of thing the League has published, both under its own imprimatur and that of its front organization, "The Anti-Capitalist Association": *Stalin's Road to America, Creeping Capitalism, Betrayal at Yalta.*

Shortly after publishing *The Biography of Gracchus Babeuf*, "Comrade X" set out on a journey to the inland city of Stalingrad. Here he met with 11 comrades sometime in 1957 or 1958 and sketched an outline of the movement. From this historic meeting emerged the now famous pamphlet "The Stalingrad Theses," or, as it is popularly called, "The Protocols of the Eleven Comrades." Present strength is estimated at only 60,000 but it is said that the movement is aiming at one million members by the beginning of 1962. "With one million



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true revolutionaries in Russia," a League pamphlet states, "and with contact with revolutionaries on the outside, it may be possible to turn the cold revolution into a hot one." Bold words! But how much chance, the Western reader will want to know, does the Babeuf League have of taking over Russia? I can state confidently, not very much.

Nevertheless, we have to remember we are dealing with Russia. And in Russia, anything can happen.

First of all, let me say that the League is by no means the manifestation of a unique vision. There are many people here who think much the same as "Comrade X." Russians have been told for a long time that the Western governments were unpopular with their own peoples, that the economies of these countries were on the verge of collapse and that revolutions would soon follow. In almost every country in Eurasia, it was said, the socialists held the upper hand. Moreover, the returning soldiers in every country were a militant force. After sacrificing so much in the war, these men would not settle for the meager rewards capitalism had to offer. And the Russians, anticipating a wave of revolutions after World War II, based on the commonly-held supposition of a postwar business crisis, began to dig in and prepare for the worst. So strong was this mood that the Russian economist Varga, who predicted that Western capitalism would be able to stabilize itself, was rebuked by Stalin himself.

Nevertheless, this revolutionary situation did not develop. The Western democracies did succeed in stabilizing themselves. And what is more, the socialist and Communist forces in the Asian countries suffered defeat after defeat. In Malaya, the British outwaited and finally defeated the Communist guerrilla forces. In the Philippines, the Huks were defeated. In South Korea, the capitalist occupation forces finally succeeded, after holding three elections, in installing an anti-Communist government, in 1948. In Japan, despite polling more than 12 million votes in the 1946 election, the socialist and Communist forces soon went into a decline and never came to power.

Moreover, as a Babeuf League pamphlet puts it: "Even in China, Korea and Vietnam, the revolutionary forces were made to submit to the humiliation of having to share their native countries with lackeys of the imperialists. These infamous divisions were duly approved by supposed Communists in several international conferences. Of course, the 'Communists' did not agree to a permanent division of these countries over the table. This would have been too blunt a sell-out. Instead, flowery rhetoric about imminent free elections to unite Korea and to unite Vietnam, served to disguise the deals which were made under the table. Of course, the elections never came about. There is no point in belaboring the imperialists for not holding elections, as our official propaganda has done. This was to be expected, since it is a well-known fact that the capitalists lie on principle.

"But what is there to excuse the behavior of our representatives, the supposed 'Communists'? They fully knew that you can't deal with the capitalists. It is well-known that *appeasement doesn't work*, and yet we continually appease the enemy that is vowed to destroy our way of life. In 1939, Stalin, who imagined himself to be a new Peter the Great, signed the infamous pact which contributed so much to our loss of revolutionary honor throughout the world. By 1941, when the Nazis attacked, our country was caught unprepared and suffered hideous losses before the people could organize themselves to defend the revolution. And yet, 20 years later, we are still committed to the same, insane policy. Need we predict that in the event of a new imperialist aggression, we will again be caught unprepared, due to the failure of the authorities to give the facts to the people?"

The pamphlet which I have quoted above at such length, entitled "The International Capitalist Conspiracy," goes on to provide voluminous documentation to support its charges that Stalin was a secret capitalist. Khrushchev comes out somewhat better as a "capitalist dupe."

The record of "sell-outs" that the League feels has been the pattern in Asia can hardly be improved upon, according to the League, by the postwar developments in the Middle East and Europe. "What happened to the European Revolution?," a League pamphlet asks. "Ever since 1917 various occult forces have been out to defeat the revolution and socialism. That these same forces have been able to penetrate the sanctuary of the revolution should not appear surprising to those comrades who reason consistently.

"Yes, comrades, the enemy has been in our midst. What else can explain Stalin's recognition of Chiang Kai-shek's government instead of Comrade Mao's? What else can explain the sell-out of the Yugoslav revolution to the capitalists, if not Tito's recognition that Stalin was a bigger capitalist than the Western countries? What occasioned the withdrawal of the progressive forces [Soviet Armed Forces – J. G.] from Iran? Why did the French and Italian Communists lay down their arms when they effectively controlled their countries? *The determining factor was the presence of crypto-capitalists and quasi-capitalists in the Soviet Foreign Office.*"

"The capitalist conspiracy has spread out from its base in Europe in the 19th Century to the point where it has now enslaved two-thirds of the human race," the League publication, *Creeping Capitalism*, states. "Where will it all end?"

It is a good question.



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# Berlin and Prestige in Europe

*by Reinhold Niebuhr*

Why is Khrushchev so stubborn about eliminating the "bone in our throat" which is Berlin? Why are we equally adamant in refusing any concessions which would compromise the status of Berlin as a "window" through which the Communist world can look into the political and physical advantages of the "free world"?

Obviously the prestige of both East and West is at stake in the Berlin question. The prestige of each side is so important because prestige, unlike the "Honor" which motivated many of the wars of traditional monarchs, holds a central place among the components of political authority.

Prestige may be drawn from the capacity to wield force; but it cannot be identified with force. Force represents the capacity to compel compliance. Prestige is the capacity to win implicit or explicit consent for the relevant authority. The sources of prestige are many: the stability of an authority through the years, its reputation for loyalty to friends, its record of relative justice in the realm of its authority, and its capacity to preside over a successful communal process. A good part of the competition between Communism and democracy is concerned with the prestige of each system as relevant to the desire of the non-technical nations to enter the charmed circle of technical competence with its cornucopia of abundance. The Sputniks enhanced the prestige of the Russians in Asia and Africa because they were symbols of the success of a non-democratic nation in negotiating the steep ascent to modern technical competence.

While Khrushchev boldly proclaims the inevitability of the triumph of Communism in the whole world, and while many of our enthusiasts are naïvely certain that we "can win the Cold War," if only this or that device is adopted, each side knows in its reflective moments that the contest between the two systems is more complicated than that.

Both sides are really aware, or should be, that the prestige advantages are with Communism in Asia and Africa and with democracy on the European continent. In Asia and Africa the spurious issue of anti-colonialism and the Communist dogma that imperialism is the fruit of capitalism is almost enough to give the Communist the advantage. Moreover the complicated relation of free enterprise to free institutions in the West is enough to confuse the minds of non-Europeans. They remember the injustices of early industrialism aggravated by the dogmas of classical economy. The Communist dogma obscures the achievement of various equilibria of power, political and economic, by which we gradually achieved justice. Moreover, the capitalist strategy of accumulating capital for industrial expansion is quite unavailable to new nations – or to old ones – moving from an agrarian to an industrial economy.

The prestige factors are radically different in the West. Europe is the homeland and seedbed of free institutions. Its culture emphasizes the value and dignity of the individual more than primitive cultures do; or, for that matter, more than either the mysticism of the Orient or the humanism of the Chinese. In Europe democracy has been made compatible with industrialism by a tortuous process. We live in the West in the securities of the welfare state, whether in socialist Sweden or Tory Britain, or "capitalistic" America. Significantly, we define our cause as "democracy" while the adversary calls it "capitalism." But by whatever name defined, the prestige of justice is with us.

In Western Europe, on the other hand, democratic justice has gained sufficient triumphs over early capitalistic injustices to make Communism irrelevant in precisely that highly-industrialized civilization for which Marx intended it. Only France with its rather static capitalism and Italy with its remnants of feudalism have had large Communist parties. Germany – not until recently a successful democracy, the birthplace of both the Marxist revolt and the Nazi aberration – has, on the other hand, become the most successful capitalistic democracy on the continent. This is partly because two defeats accomplished what the democratic forces alone could not accomplish: the destruction of the feudal classes and the subordination of military to civil power. Germany is therefore a great threat to Communist prestige and to its pretension that it is a "wave of the future."

Berlin is an obvious showcase of the desirability and economic viability of free institutions in the context of European culture. The daily stream of 2,000 refugees revealed that while dogmatic collectivism may have its attractions in non-European cultures it does not attract highly-developed industrial societies. Its collective farms are not attractive to the men of the soil in Western Europe who have long since mastered the art of the

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voluntary collective use of farm machinery so as to make efficiency compatible with the private ownership of the land – perhaps the most stubborn and cherished form of private ownership in the history of civilization. A goodly percentage of the East German refugees have been farmers, though craftsmen and professional classes, too, have furnished their quotas.

Our own prestige is quite as obviously involved. There may be questions about the relevance of our institutions in Laos or Cambodia; but the Berlin situation vividly reveals both how desirable and, in fact, how much desired are free institutions in Western Europe. Western Europe is of course not powerful enough to withstand Communist military pressure. Berlin is clearly the apex of the pyramid of prestige which is our stake in Western Europe. If we yield on Berlin, even Germany –as Adenauer hints – may be tempted to neutralism. The whole of Western Europe would lose heart. Significantly, de Gaulle, a not too loyal member of NATO, and preoccupied with Algerian problems, is as adamant as we are on Berlin.

The German threat is aggravated and made more vivid by that sorry remnant of the war, that lack of prescience on the part of the West, which left a non-Communist enclave essentially defenseless in a Communist sea. It is surprising, particularly since Berlin has become so focal, that few people have interested themselves in the grievous errors of judgment which have placed Berlin in such an exposed position. The errors were no doubt prompted by the traditional assumptions of military allies that their alliance would outlast the victory over their foes – assumptions which have been consistently refuted by history. In the case of the alliance with the Russians, there were sufficient indications of incompatibility even in the war to have refuted the assumptions. Probably only the fortunate or unfortunate involvement of leaders of both political parties (FDR and Eisenhower) has prevented the matter from being subjected to close Congressional scrutiny. In any case, raking over past mistakes, the seeds of our present embarrassments, will not extricate us from the embarrassments.

The Administration is clearly right in its stubborn stand. But both we and the Russians, despite the intransigence of both sides, insist that the Berlin situation must not lead to a nuclear war; that the situation must be ultimately negotiated. The real question is whether there is any negotiable element in the situation. We are in a particularly embarrassing position because the "rights" on which we insist are rights derived from common conquest and common occupation of a vanquished nation. That vanquished nation has meanwhile become our ally in a contest with our former ally. The course of history has not invalidated these "rights." But a resourceful politician, such as Khrushchev undoubtedly is, was bound to attempt to destroy our source of prestige by his strategic superiority.

Most of the suggested *modus vivendi* have proved to be inadequate. The Senate Majority Leader, Mike Mansfield, suggests a free status for the whole of Berlin. But the insecurity of "free cities" is notoriously fragile. Danzig's fate is a convenient reminder. The alternative of a disarmed "neutral" Germany, after the manner of Austria, is obviously too dangerous for the West in view of Russia's geographic position and its capacity for political subversion. The idea of a unified Germany through "free elections" is obviously unacceptable to Russia. It would mean uniting Germany against Russia. It has not been a live option for some years despite our lip service to the formula.

The idea that we could have relaxed tensions by denying the Germans tactical nuclear weapons may have had some merit in the past. But in any case they do not have possession of tactical nuclear weapons except as we make them available to NATO. The inevitable use of tactical nuclear weapons in a European war has undoubtedly wiped out the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons and given point to Khrushchev's warning that a war over Berlin will inevitably involve nuclear weapons. President Kennedy's and General Taylor's emphasis on the necessity of building our non-nuclear capabilities is nevertheless important. The President is right in insisting that the presence of our troops in Berlin was designed as a "hostage" of our commitment to the defense of the city.

The project – popular in liberal circles of Britain and also in our country – for spending billions to remove the whole city of Berlin safely into the Western portion of Germany is politically naïve because it disregards the importance of prestige in international competition. The proposal stems from a type of liberalism which is ignorant of the relations of power to politics and of prestige to power.

The elimination of these alleged viable strategies does not of course give us a viable strategy in countering Khrushchev's calculated aggravation of the Berlin crisis. He has shrewdly sealed off East Berlin even before signing a peace treaty. He has violated the liberties of the East Germans more than our rights. Despite Mayor Willy Brandt's frantic appeal to the President to produce actions rather than words, the "juridical position" (in Eisenhower's phrase) which we have as one of the conquering powers hardly empowers us to be the guardian of East German liberties. In his recent notes Khrushchev has challenged our rights on the ground that we use them, not for the original purpose of jointly occupying Germany, but for the purpose of defending Germany against Communist tyranny.

Despite all embarrassments, derived from the fact that history has altered the political and moral positions which first gave rise to our agreements with the Russians, we must stand firm and not abandon Berlin. We



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must not initiate hostilities; but we can counter force calculated to push us out. This is undoubtedly a war of nerves. A nuclear catastrophe is always a possible consequence of miscalculation.

But surely we are entitled to weigh the improbability of Khrushchev starting a war for the sake of Berlin in the face of the fervent hopes of the Russian people for peace and of the probable embarrassments with his satellites in the event of war. Surely a politician as shrewd as Khrushchev will exploit the advantages of a dictatorship over a democracy in brinkmanship as far as he can. The fact that he raises all the fuss even before the Party Congress may suggest that he must deal with the core of Stalinist intransigence. He is probably also under the necessity of proving to the Chinese that he is not "soft on capitalism." But meanwhile the progress of Communist economic and technical achievement in Russia and of its prestige in the non-European culture areas are bound to make him more cautious than his present words imply. If he is as shrewd as he seems to be, he can still exploit Communism's prestige in Asia and Africa; and quietly, though not openly, acknowledge that its prospects in Europe are dim and would not improve by a nuclear holocaust.

We can meanwhile produce some negotiable items which are not related to the safety of Berlin. Two years ago de Gaulle suggested that we ought to acknowledge the permanence of the Oder-Neisse line. Since it can not be changed without a war, and since its guarantee would make the Poles less dependent on Russia, we should have taken that suggestion more seriously. Even the Germans would not mind too much. They would mind more any tacit or explicit recognition of the East German regime, though that intransigent diplomat, John Foster Dulles, long ago suggested that we might recognize the East Germans as agents undermining the Russians. For such a tacit recognition would probably be regarded as undermining the inflexible dogma that Germany must be reunited.

In view of the fact that our European allies and even some West Germans are not certain whether reunification is either desirable or feasible, we might well risk defying a dogma to which the Germans, on their part, must pay lip service if for no other reason than to salve their uneasy conscience about the fate of their blood brothers under the Communist yoke.

The sacrifice of a dogma unrelated to political realities and possibilities would be a small price to pay for successful negotiations involving no loss of our prestige and giving Khrushchev a face-saving device. He must have such a device. That is a political necessity. Meanwhile we are entitled to speculate that the rigor with which he now seals off East Germany may in time abate as the Ulbricht regime faces the consequence of dealing with the rebellious spirits hitherto syphoned out via the Berlin escape route.

# Kennedy's Economics

*by Seymour E. Harris*

In his June television program, Mr. Walter Lippmann said of President Kennedy: What he has done in the first four or five months is "first of all to carry on in all its essentials the Eisenhower economic philosophy. . . . It's like the Eisenhower Administration 30 years younger." Criticism from labor leaders and others has been even stronger. For instance, the able economist Oscar Gass, writing in a recent issue of *Commentary*, declared that President Kennedy has "projected little and accomplished almost nothing." Gass is critical of his tax, spending and interest rate policy. Leon Keyserling, a former Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, who was so largely responsible for the acceptance of the "growth" thesis by the Democrats, found the President's goals far too low and stated that the "proposed programs fall far short even of compatibility with these excessively low goals. . . ."

I do not go along with these criticisms – though I am not critical of the economists, including members of the present Council, who have been urging larger deficits as a means of treating the unemployment problem. I share a view that a $10 billion deficit or thereabouts may be necessary to bring unemployment down to around four percent by next year. But this does not mean that the President should necessarily support a $10 billion deficit for Fiscal Year 1962.

Economics is one thing; politics is another. No one has criticized the President for lack of political acumen.

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I have seen no evidence that the Congress is prepared to go along with large deficits except for security reasons. In fact, on a number of vital issues, it is clear that the President is ahead of Congress, which was not even prepared to go along with the President when he proposed $2.5 billion for a four-year Urban Renewal Program. Congress clearly differentiates between budgetary expenditures and other commitments in the Housing Bill. Nor did the Congress accept the President's recommendations in full in other welfare programs: *e.g.* the liberalization of Old Age Insurance and the Manpower Training Bill.

Should the President move too far ahead of the Congress in his espousal of deficit financing, his program could be in jeopardy. Where the line is drawn is a *matter of political judgment. In my opinion a $5 billion* deficit in Fiscal Year 1962, largely explained by the Berlin crisis, is acceptable to Congress; a $7 billion deficit may be tolerated; a $10 billion one, substantially tied to welfare programs or (and) tax cuts would likely induce sabotage of the economic program of the President and the New Frontier.

The charge made against the President is that he appears excessively concerned with keeping spending and deficits down. But no Administration has advanced as far as the Kennedy Administration in accepting Keynesian economics. Whereas in his last Economic Report, President Eisenhower was silent on the recession and his aides, inclusive of Nixon, continued to deny it in the late months of 1960, Kennedy proclaimed its presence and expressed a determination to treat it with federal deficits. In his speech before the National Press Club of June 20 the Secretary of the Treasury supported deficit financing as a means of treating a deficit – and this is the first time, to my knowledge, that this position has been taken publicly by a Secretary of the Treasury. Anyone who doubts the advance of the New Frontier should compare the Keynesian thinking of Roosevelt, Morgenthau, Snyder, Humphrey and Anderson with that of Kennedy. It was Eisenhower and Humphrey, not Kennedy, who would cut taxes at the top of a boom just when the appropriate policy would be a rise of taxes to treat the exuberant economy.

Indeed, in the debates on economic policy, the President has been cautious in supporting large deficits. But economists, increasingly aware of the emergence of budgetary surpluses long before full employment would be reached, urged recourse to deficits through tax cuts or (and) increased public expenditures. Most economists agree that the solution of the unemployment problem depends especially on adequacy of demand, in turn related to appropriate fiscal and monetary policy. Deficits and low money rates are the facets of adequate demand policy.

The Council and economists generally stress the need of appropriate monetary and fiscal policy as a means not only of dealing with cyclical unemployment but also with the estimated 1-2 millions structurally unemployed. That the level of demand is of great significance is suggested by this fact: of eight industries that experienced a decline of jobs from 7.5 to 5 million in the postwar, the loss was but one percent average in prosperous years and eight percent in depressed years.

In Washington, nevertheless, there seems to be a disposition to over-stress the general against the specific attack. No general measures are going to solve the problems of the textile, coal, automobile, aircraft and similar towns though they contribute to a solution. The rise of unemployment at the top of a boom in successive cycles, the rise in numbers and persistence of depressed areas, the decline of demand for the unskilled, the large increase of young and older workers especially vulnerable to unemployment – all of these point to a residue of unemployment requiring special measures.

The President has been well aware of this problem of residual structural unemployment. His support of the Manpower Training Bill, the Area Redevelopment Act, a permanent revision of unemployment compensation – all of these point to his determination to solve the problem of structural unemployment by direct attacks as well as the deficit and monetary policy routes.

It is not clear that *beyond a certain point* the most economical way of treating structural unemployment is through general measures. The Secretary of Labor estimated that $700 million would finance the retraining of 800,000 unemployed in four years. Even if only one out of eight found jobs – say only for eight years – the cost per man-year would be less than $1,000. But the cost of an additional job per year through deficit financing can very roughly be put at about $4,000 – and this allows for the secondary effects on income of the deficit. In both instances, I do not deduct for gains in relief, unemployment compensation and taxes.

Hence the President's reluctance to incur large deficits may, in part, be explained by a somewhat greater reliance on the direct approach (*e.g.*, retraining, stimulation of new industries in depressed areas) than is favored by many economists.

Another point can be raised in support of the President's position, namely, that he has a responsibility to establish priorities in spending. He may not have foreseen the exact time of the Berlin crisis, but the possibility of an intensification of the Cold War was clear to all. Excessive commitments on welfare outlays, and a tax cut, if added to later security outlays, might have put an excessive burden on the budget. The deficit in Fiscal Year 1961 was $4 billion, and current estimates for Fiscal Year 1962 are $5 billion, though the ultimate figure may well be higher.

Whereas Congress has gone along willingly with the President's proposals to spend for space and security, it has been amenable to welfare commitments. In-



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deed, there may be differences of opinion on whether the President is seeking an adequate deficit to bring recovery and stimulate growth, but that anyone can describe Kennedy's economics as a carbon copy of Eisenhower's is almost beyond belief.

The major objective of Eisenhower's Administration was to reduce federal expenditures and deficits, with the incidental advantage of price stability. The budget was not an instrument of policy, but an objective. For Kennedy, the budget was also a means of stimulating the economy.

In his Special Message on the Defense Budget of March 28, President Kennedy said: "Our arms must be adequate to meet our commitments and ensure our security without being bound by arbitrary budget ceilings." In response to growing dangers he did not cut the military budget by $10 billion as Eisenhower did and impose on the nation the massive retaliation doctrine in large part to appease the economisers; nor did he give his Secretary of the Treasury virtually a veto power over military budgets as Sherman Adams reveals Eisenhower bestowed on Humphrey. Kennedy, in the face of danger, despite his concern for responsible spending policies, increased the military budget by at least $5 billion.

Nor has Kennedy followed Eisenhower in the latter's determination to balance the budget account rather than the budget. In order to give the budget a good appearance, Eisenhower rented post offices rather than built them (despite the increased costs), diverted Civil Service pension funds to the ordinary budget, sold FHA and CCC paper despite the adverse effects on the economy, disposed of $10 billion or more of relatively long-term securities in the midst of a recession in order to save interest and incidentally abort a recovery; and would finance a $100 billion road program out of a trust fund. At the outset of his Administration, Kennedy stopped the sale of long-term securities and the sale of FHA paper in a recession when these were obviously serving to raise interest rates while the objective was to reduce them.

In the midst of great perils, the government has to mobilize all weapons and that includes monetary policy. Yet Eisenhower refused to tell the Federal Reserve what was required of it and thus allowed the Fed to restrict monetary supplies and induce unemployment. At the outset Kennedy made it clear that he expected a policy of the Fed that was consistent with the objectives of the government. The Fed felt pressure from the Administration to provide more credit, reduce interest rates in the recession and in the recovery phase to keep rates from rising substantially. The President also understands that a reduction in rates would put a smaller burden on the budget: this is an alternative and additional way of bringing recovery.

Those who think that Kennedy's economics are a version of Eisenhower's should consider Kennedy's welfare proposals and accomplishments in the first six months of his Administration; and they should compare these with the Eisenhower economic achievements over eight years. Within six months the Congress had approved a depressed areas bill, a rise in minimum wages, temporary unemployment benefits, liberalization of social security, benefits for dependent children of unemployed parents, programs for water pollution, and the omnibus housing bill. In addition, the President asked for aid to education, college aid, hospital insurance and permanent revisions in unemployment compensation. Only in 1933 and 1935 can one find accomplishments of equal magnitude. Within three weeks of inauguration, the President had sent a temporary unemployment compensation bill to the Congress; and approval was obtained within two months of inauguration. Compare Eisenhower's timetable in 1958 for temporary help to the unemployed – a move made only under threat of permanent changes in unemployment compensation in a bill sponsored by Senator Kennedy.

Finally, Kennedy's objectives go way beyond fiscal responsibility. He was anxious to end the recession. In fact, a recovery of the second quarter of 1961 was a record achievement for the first quarter of a recovery and especially in relation to the percentage decline of GNP. His spirited attack on the recession contributed greatly to its early end and quick recovery. However, Kennedy was even more interested in growth. The record on anti-recessionary policy was good. But how to get the 4-5 percent of growth so necessary for our struggle with the Communists and an adequate welfare program without adding greatly to tax burdens?

Whereas Eisenhower and his aides either avoided discussion of growth – or when they did confront it, spoke only of the stimulation of private investment through tax favors – Kennedy has stressed education, housing, scientific research and medical care and research as the ingredients that would yield growth; though he was aware that the increased investment was a factor he has stressed that investment without adequate purchasing power and consumption would mean a waste of resources.

In short, Kennedy knows that the budget is a weapon to be used for economic improvement; that the objective of economic policy is not a balanced budget but a balanced economy; that the budget and the monetary machine are weapons to be used to treat cyclical indispositions, the disease of structural unemployment, and to stimulate growth; that in order to achieve the larger gains, the President has a responsibility to prevent any creeping inflation from becoming a galloping inflation; that fiscal and monetary tools, however important, are not the exclusive weapons for achieving economic goals; and that economic therapy must be tethered to political realities.



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# *Salinger's Oasis of Innocence*

*by Anne Marple*

Salinger's first full length novel, *The Catcher in the Rye*, emerged after scattered fragments concerning his characters appeared during a seven year span. For some time now, it has been evident that Salinger's second novel may be developing in the same way. Salinger writes of *Franny and Zooey*: "Both stories are early, critical entries in a narrative series I am doing about a family of settlers in 20th Century New York, the Glasses."

*Franny and Zooey*
by J. D. Salinger
(Little, Brown; $4)

*Franny* is a beautifully balanced short story. Franny, at twenty, is on the edge of "a tenth-rate nervous breakdown." There is a certain resemblance to the emotional crisis faced by Holden Caulfield in *The Catcher in the Rye*. But Franny is not to be saved by a contact with innocence. Instead, she begins a weekend with her pseudo-intellectual lover, Lane Coutell.

In a brilliant scene between the two at lunch, Franny speaks of the writings of a holy man. She tries to explain the Jesus Prayer:

> "... if you keep saying that prayer over and over and over again – you only have to do it with your *lips* at first – then eventually what happens, the prayer becomes self-active . . . you do it to purify your whole outlook and get an absolutely new conception of what everything's about."

Lane's preoccupation with the mechanics of eating afford a subtle contrast of spirit versus flesh. Failing to communicate her feelings to Lane, Franny flees his belated declaration of love and collapses. Her lips "began to move, forming soundless words" repeating the Jesus Prayer, "Lord Jesus Christ, have mercy on me."

*Zooey* continues the story of Franny's emotional crisis three days later. This "prose home movie" is unwieldy as a short story. Its possible future incorporation into a novel may justify its present form, but at present we must judge it as a short story.

The first person introduction by Buddy Glass seems unnecessary. Buddy is surely the least lovable and most self-conscious of the Glass children to date. Salinger seems not entirely unaware of this. (Seymour has said of his brother, that cleverness is his "permanent affliction.") Great demands are made on the reader's credulity by Buddy's insistence that he was able to reconstruct the action of *Zooey* second hand.

The puzzling intrusion of the Buddy Glass introduction also serves as an apologia for Salinger. Buddy warns, "The plot line itself, to finish up, is largely the result of a rather unholy collaborative effort." The frequent inclusion of diaries and letters in the Glass Saga indicate that Salinger is having additional mechanical difficulties with his embarrassing wealth of Glassiana. He has become so enmeshed in his material that his artistic judgment is clouded. Sections of *Zooey* are bearable only if one has a prior affection for the Glass family.

The first half of *Zooey* (sans introduction), is a momentarily interrupted scene between Zooey and his mother. In this Salingeresque masterpiece of characterization and dialogue, Zooey comes off second best to Salinger's loving treatment of Mrs. Glass. The conversation between the two reflects Salinger's early interest in playwriting.

The rest of *Zooey* records his several attempts to pry Franny loose from her frantic grasp on the Jesus Prayer. He is well qualified for the task, for as he tells her, "... you've been funnel *fed* on just about the same amount of religious philosophy that I have. . . ." Zooey's success is not immediate. Franny is suffering the hell "of being unable to love." Only when Zooey convinces Franny that "anyone *anywhere*" is "Seymour's Fat Lady" is "Christ Himself" does Franny find release.

Buddy Glass has described *Zooey* as "a compound, or multiple, love story, pure and complicated." The use of the word *pure* is echoed in Franny's explanation of the goal of the Jesus Prayer, "you do it to purify your whole outlook." Franny's quest for purity ties *Franny and Zooey* to a subterranean theme that underlies most of the work Salinger has published during the last twenty-one years.

There is evident, throughout Salinger's writing, a consistent preoccupation with innocence, a preference for the chaste, complemented by the inability of his adult characters to reconcile physical and spiritual love. It is obvious on a re-examination of Salinger's work that his characters are extremely limited in their choice of sexual expression.

Salinger's first novel, *The Catcher in the Rye*, is his most eloquent defense of innocence in conflict with an amoral world. There is a certain logic in Salinger's choice of an adolescent protagonist. The chastity of adolescence needs little explanation – idealism will suffice. It is to children and to nuns that Holden turns briefly as outposts of the innocence he desires. Holden places women on a comfortably distant pedestal, divorced from sex. Although he loved Jane, he never puts the purity of his love to any test of physical expression. He avoids contacting her. What is suggested or hinted at in Salinger's earlier work is full grown in his novel

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– the idealization of the celibate, the chaste, and the innocent.

Salinger's adult characters cannot integrate physical and spiritual love. Even the reconciliation of both in marriage is denied them. Married couples are invariably mismated and miserable – marriage itself a badly bungled affair. The insensitive girl friend runs a close second to the shallow wife. In the Salinger world, woman plays her ancient role of Eve, Pandora, or Lorelei. She can exist beloved or uncriticized only as an asexual saint or mother. When she expresses herself as a sexual creature, Salinger sees her as witch or vampire. As William Wiegand has said, "Where object of delight is found in women, these women are often little girls or nuns, and what is admired is sexless in essence."

If the Glass family are to form the basis for Salinger's second novel, it is clear that his unremitting emphasis on sexual innocence or abstinence will be reinforced. Boo Boo alone seems to be happily married, but we have seen her only in the role of a mother. As a wife, she may well share the inability of Salinger's other characters to find love and sex anything but antagonistic to her happiness.

Walt Glass is killed before his romance can consummate in marriage; his twin Waker is a Jesuit priest. Seymour's repeated concern for his bride's chastity precedes his temporary flight from the wedding ceremony. He later kills himself while on a second honeymoon. Buddy is maladjusted and unmarried at 38. Zooey, a bachelor in his late twenties, suffers from ulcers and has an abnormal fear of his own beauty. Franny evades the physical demands of her lover by a "tenth-rate nervous breakdown" and temporarily embraces the esoteric philosophy of a holy man.

It is not likely that a pattern so firmly rooted in Salinger's earliest work and so consistently developed, is likely to change – nor is this particularly desirable. Lesser talents have wallowed in the sexual without a fraction of the illumination of character Salinger is able to give us. But admittedly, it is difficult to see how the avoidance of so obvious a part of human life cannot impede the free flow of Salinger's creative life.

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# The Heart of Hofmannsthal

*by Victor Lange*

It is one of the ironies of the literary market place that the Austrian writer Hugo von Hofmannsthal should in this country chiefly be known as the librettist of some of Richard Strauss' operas, and barely at all as one of the three or four most impressive European repre-

*Poems and Verse Plays*
by Hugo von Hofmannstahl
edited by Michael Hamburger
(Bollinger-Pantheon; $6)

sentatives of modern symbolist poetry. A volume of his prose which was published in English some ten years ago with an admirably sensitive introduction by Hermann Broch should have left no doubt as to the stature of Hofmannstal's achievement. His critical writings in that volume demonstrated a constant concern with the decreasing efficacy of poetry in a society that has weakened its resources of speech and reduced the poetic utterance to a private vision.

T. S. Eliot was one of the first to draw the attention of Anglo-Saxon readers to Hofmannsthal nearly 40 years ago by inviting him to contribute to *The Dial*. They shared a lively interest in the devices of modern poetry; but, more important still, both were committed to cultural traditions – English and Austrian – which they felt to be obsolescent and which they desired to transcend in various forms of mysticism. In their best work they each demonstrated a strong taste for the baroque, and a moral reliance on classical convictions.

If Hofmannsthal wrote no *Waste Land* he experienced, no less sharply than Eliot, the discrepancy between complex poetic insight and discredited poetic speech and imagery: his "Letter of Lord Chandos" and his "Essay on Colors" are central texts in the literature of modern existentialism. No longer to be able to count on adequate means of stating his own vision brought Hofmannsthal (after 1900) to a suspension of all creative writing which lasted for many years. The documents leading to this remarkable spiritual crisis are contained in the first of these two volumes; the second now gives us 25 early poems (nearly all the poetry, that is to say, which Hofmannsthal ever published) and six verse plays, all in the original German as well an in exceedingly careful and congenial translations by seven of the best English translators of German poetry.

When Hofmannsthal published his first poems in 1890 he was little more than sixteen and still at school; ten years later his work as a lyrical poet had virtually come to an end. From the beginning and throughout his later life he wrote poetic plays, and Mr. T. S. Eliot is undoubtedly right when in his brief Introduction to the present volume he suggests that "Hofmannsthal is worthy to stand with Yeats and with Claudel as one of the three men who did most, in the same age, to maintain and re-animate verse drama." Two of these verse plays, *Death and the Fool* (1893) and *The Death of Titian* (1892) contain the flavor and theme of nearly all of Hofmannsthal's poetry: they are at once lyrical and didactic, rich and sensuous is their imagery, and full of Pre-Raphaelite awareness of the transience of life and beauty. At the same time they contain the critical counterposition to the then-fashionable aestheticism, in that they expose the aesthete as an irresponsible escapist devoid of authentic emotions.

This presence of a dialectic of feeling is characteristic of much Viennese writing at the end of the century: it becomes more and more refined in the work of Musil and Doderer, and springs, of course, from the particular cultural ambiguities of the obsolescent social order of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Hofmannsthal's poetic plays are essentially lyrical masks for that elusive self which Hofmannsthal's earlier work seems intent on defining. How to know this self without reference to any dependable order, how to speak of it intelligibly, and how to use it towards an effective identification with the world – these remain Hofmannsthal's moral and poetic concerns.

Michael Hamburger speaks of Hofmannsthal's protean capacity to absorb and transform attitudes and forms that were not always his own, and he relates this sensitiveness for various and disparate experiences to the same associative instincts in many other modern European poets – Rilke, Pound, Eliot or Benn. It is true that even the small body of Hofmannsthal's lyrical poems contains an astonishing variety of moods and perspectives; at the same time there is a remarkably steady progression in Hofmannsthal's efforts at delimiting the haphazard mobility of self, and of creating a balance between lyrical assertion and the acceptance of an empirical order. In the two earliest poems here printed, "Experience" (1892) and "World and Self" (1893) the radical gulf between the two spheres is the single theme. But while in the first the world is carried away on the stream of time, and a "nameless longing after life now wept within my

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## NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Anne Marple *is a young California critic who makes her first* New Republic *appearance with this issue.* Victor Lange *is a professor of German at Princeton.* Margaret Halsey *is the author of many books, including* With Malice Toward Some, Color Blind, *and* This Demi-Paradise.



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spirit silently," the second asserts the capacity of the poet to carry Atlas' burden, the world in its infinitude of actuality, "as he might hold the slenderest of lutes, one gently murmuring, or like a dish of fruit will bear the world's weight upon one hand." Gradually, in one after another of these poems, time and space take on their own positive reality, until, three or four years later, in such poems as "Song of Life" (1896), "The Youth in the Landscape" (1898), the inward and the outward, self and world, are seen as distinct, if interrelated, realms of being. This development Hofmannsthal set for himself as a primary task: he wished (without the help of any form of religious faith), to emerge as from a state of pre-existence into conscious and creative life.

Mr. Hamburger whose introduction to this splendid volume offers an excellent summary of the historical context in which Hofmannsthal must be seen, and at the same time of Hofmannsthal's own psychological development, reminds us of a tendency in the young poet towards mysticism and intellectual vagueness. But he insists that this subjective state of "self-generated magic" was soon superseded in Hofmannsthal by an attitude of essential humility towards the world of being and, correspondingly, a view of language that recognized increasingly its own power of reflection and persuasion. The dream as a link between self and reality gradually gave way to an identification with the world of social and historical continuity. Hofmannsthal knew of the risks known to all symbolist poets, that a world deprived of its dreams might well be a world without meaning: unlike Yeats, whose early preoccupation with the sheer imagination parallels that of Hofmannsthal and who deliberately developed poetic mirror images if his magical self, Hofmannsthal could not, as he moved from pre-existence to maturity, remain a lyrical poet. His verse plays indicate the transition from the monologue of extreme sensibility to that polyphony of dramatic and theatrical synthesis which later became the vehicle of his humanism. Before he turned altogether to his prose-comedies, he attempted, in *The Mine at Falum* and *The Marriage of Sobeide* – both included in this volume – to project the conflict between self and reality in terms of the aspirations and failures of married love.

The social and, indeed, linguistic ritualism of the Austrian tradition, which in his early writings Hofmannsthal was inclined to regard as inferior to his created dream world, became increasingly appealing to him as offering a new and effective kind of symbolism. In some of his libretti, and especially in that masterpiece of character comedy *The Man who was Difficult*, he employs this language of sophisticated Austrian convention with the most melancholy elegance. The wonderful if deceptive sense of ease and of supreme musicality, the genius for transparent imagery and the telling metaphor Hofmannsthal had from the beginning.

If the small but impressive body of Hofmannsthal's lyric poetry is not yet sufficiently known, a publication such as the present volume in the Bollingen Series will correct this unbalance. Mr. Hamburger promises a third collection containing Hofmannsthal's later work; we can only hope that it will include a translation of *The Tower*, one of the greatest pieces of modern German dramatic poetry.


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# A Daughter to her Mother

*by Margaret Halsey*

*A Matter of Life and Death*
by Virgilia Peterson
(Atheneum; $5)

Virgilia Peterson is that most old-fashioned of human beings – a woman with accomplishments. She has long been known for the warmth, lucidity and intelligence of her book reviews; and both on the lecture platform and in print, she has developed a loyal and grateful coterie of followers. The loyalty and gratitude stem from the fact that almost alone among popular book critics, she has staunchly refused to compromise with the ever more shabby standards of the affluent society.

Miss Peterson has now written her autobiography, and it is a fascinating and original piece of work. For one thing, she has daringly cast her story in the form of a letter to her mother, who is now dead, and whom she feared and resented with all the passion of an energetic, volatile and creative nature.

The experienced reader, while responding with genuine interest to this gambit as he begins the book, cannot help but have a qualm. "She'll never be able to keep up," he says to himself. "Round about the middle, this letter-to-my-mother bit is going to sag like an ungartered stocking."

Happily, the qualm proves to be unjustified. Miss Peterson's device remains taut and strong and weight-worthy right to the end, and the reason it holds up is because of her undeviating attempt to be scrupulously honest with herself.

Ever since the advent of Freudian psychology, we have had a glut of autobiographies or autobiographical novels about the hateful parent, and some of them, when written by people of talent, have made that parent extremely convincing. But the weakness of all these books has been that they are out of balance – the autobiographer is never able to be as severe with himself as he is with the mutilating parent.

Miss Peterson, however, has not fallen into that trap. She has had the mental discipline to probe her own behavior just as searchingly and critically as she has that of her well-spoken, contemptuous, dismissive mother. One comes away from *A Matter of Life and Death* with a sense of what it must have cost the author to examine so unflinchingly the mother-daughter relationship.

Physically, at least, Virgilia Peterson's childhood was comfortable. She grew up in a New York brownstone, since razed to make room for Radio City, and her parents were people of wide cultural interests. Subsequently she married a Polish prince, brought up two children, wrote a best-seller, had infantile paralysis, and became familiar with money troubles. She lectured all over the United States and has experienced at first hand the ravages of both war and TV. As a critic and reviewer of books, she serves an important interpretative function in our society.

Her autobiography is not only arrestingly personal, but also very much a book of our time. She describes, for instance – in a passage that is a model of terseness and economy – her clash with the McCarthyites while she was moderator of a television program. In this sequence, the author is concerned only with her own failure to enter a protest soon enough; but as she examines her own responsibilities, she inadvertently gives a picture that is all too familiar of the cheapness and cowardice which pervaded the scene.

Besides witch-hunting, Miss Peterson also writes in her life story of money, the market place, old-fashioned upbringing, marriage, divorce, friendship, suicide and the crucible of popularity and success. The material is the more persuasive because of the graceful writing effect – the narrative moves in long, rhythmical sentences that somehow suggest the swags of laurel on an Adam mantelpiece.

*A Matter of Life and Death* is an important book because of its courageous adherence to standards. More than that, it is a shining example of the proper use of candor. Miss Peterson's story quivers with strong feeling and is alive with the instinct for exactitude and truth, but it contains no bedroom scenes and no hippopotamus wallowing at the mudholes of emotion.

There will be those, nevertheless, who find *A Matter of Life and Death* embarrassing, for the moral climate of our time is so shallow that many people are no longer able to tolerate anything that has the quality of genuine earnestness. For readers, however, who believe with Socrates that "the life unexamined is the life unlived," what emerges from Virgilia Peterson's book is a warm, brave and vividly human personality.

# Tales of a Wise Old Man

*by Gerald W. Johnson*

*The Battle of the Wild Turkey*
and Other Tales
by Alvin Johnson
(Atheneum; $4.50)

Alvin Johnson is 87 years old and it is a safe bet that he has been up to something every day for 75 of those years. Born in Nebraska, he took his PhD at Columbia. He has taught in six great universities, was president of the New School for 22 years, an editor of *The New Republic* for 10 years and of *The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* for six, has written books with such formidable titles as *Essays in Social Economics*, wrote the New York anti-discrimination statute, and at all times has been a leader of what is usually called liberal, but should be called realistic political thinking.

So now, after a long and busy life in which he has been everywhere, seen everything, and known everybody, he spins a few yarns, and they are all, with one exception, tales of America in the making, specifically of Nebraska when he was a boy and even earlier. The exception is what the publisher calls a "gothic tale" out of Denmark; all the rest are as native to American soil as



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BUT **THEN** CAME THE **CONGO** CRISIS WHEN IT SEEMED THAT WAR WAS **INEVITABLE.** MY **EYES** STARTED BOTHERING ME AND I HAD TO GIVE UP READING THE PAPERS AND GET **GLASSES.**

BUT EXCEPT FOR MY EYES I WAS **STILL** IN PRETTY GOOD SHAPE - AND THEN CAME THE **LAOTIAN** CRISIS. IT SEEMED THAT WAR WAS **INEVITABLE.** MY HEARING STARTED BOTHERING ME AND I HAD TO GIVE UP LISTENING TO RADIO NEWS AND GET A **HEARING** AID.

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The Hall Syndicate, Inc.

THEN I HEARD SOMEWHERE THAT CRITICS WERE ATTACKING AMERICAN YOUTH FOR BEING OUT OF SHAPE -

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8-6

I CAN'T **SEE** -
I CAN'T **HEAR** -
I CAN'T **BREATHE** -
I CAN'T **STAND** -
AND I DON'T WANT ANYTHING MORE THAN TO GO INTO A FALLOUT SHELTER AND **VANISH** -

WHAT DO THEY MEAN **OUT OF SHAPE**? I LOOK UPON MYSELF AS THE MAN OF THE FUTURE.

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the scuppernong grape – and no less individual and inimitable in flavor.

That they are good stories goes without saying. Alvin Johnson long ago became a master of a supple, nervous prose that precludes his writing a really bad English sentence; and long and rigorous intellectual discipline has given his thinking the clarity of a diamond of the first water.

But for this reader the literary merit of the volume is of less significance than its demonstration of the power of a national tradition that could impress such an enduring stamp upon a mind of extraordinary vigor and versatility. Alvin Johnson has thought intensely and incessantly for longer than most of his countrymen have existed; but in the sunset of his life he writes of people who thought little, but lived intensely. Most of them lived in poverty and some in pain; but they lived well and they died well. This makes them worth the attention of their chronicler, for he is of the breed of Seneca's wise man, who "will think of life in terms of quality, not quantity."

## MOVIES

# *Breakfast at Macy's*

*Breakfast at Tiffany's* (Paramount)
*The Great War* (Lopert)

If there were no Truman Capote, the film of *Breakfast at Tiffany's* (assuming that it could have existed anyway) would be a satisfactory sentimental comedy, much like the ones that Jean Arthur used to make. But hulking over it is the fact of the author, the Littlest Giant since Stephen A. Douglas, whose quality sternly underscores some shortcomings in the picture.

Those who have read Capote's short novel may have liked it well enough. Those who have re-read it (as I have) may like it a good deal more than that. It seems now a finely turned work and, excepting the romanticism about bartenders that afflicts *New Yorker* writers and alumni, every sentence, every phrase sounds inevitable, flavorful, apt. It lacks the larger resonance of the work with which it has been very often compared – Isherwood's "Sally Bowles"; but it is a vivid memoir of an interesting girl who seems to have left the author wishing he could find a way to use her, at last perceiving that there was nothing to do but portray her.

The film adapter, George Axelrod, has used her. He has tidied her language and behavior, built her a nice symmetrical plot, converted the observer-narrator into a boy friend, inserted cute scenes like the one where they go into Tiffany's to get a cheap ring engraved, teased out several elements in the book so that the ends could be tied in neat knots, and in general has tailored Capote's astringent, truthful tale into a slick movie. But it *is* slick; and since, for American films, this is a lean year (decade? century?), let us count our mixed blessings.

As Holly Golightly, the female cavalier of café society, Audrey Hepburn is perfectly cast but performs somewhat less than perfectly. Her beautiful piquancy and talent are no less than ever, but either her director here has not as keen an ear as he ought to have or else Miss Hepburn (always a possibility with big stars) is not quite manageable by any except famous directors. At any rate, in the opening sequences, her readings have an unwonted lack of color and conviction and her performance lacks the easy control that makes some of her films re-visitable. These early sequences may well have been filmed last, but the effect is as if she had got a firmer grip on the part as she went along and brought it into sharper focus. Perhaps it was the American accent that worried her. Nevertheless I cannot think of another actress I would have preferred in the part.

George Peppard, as the young writer, is pleasant and credible, an eminently useful player in films. He is the newest exponent of the Fonda-James Stewart factor, the boyish man who is our national ideal, strong but reticent, with the suggestion that he has a piece of mom's apple pie tucked away just out of sight and that no matter how much he likes writing and girls, what he would like best is to be back at the old swimming hole with the gang. But this quality is natural to Peppard, not contrived; and, combined with his competence, should carry him far.

Patricia Neal, the rich wife whose gigolo he is, has an unsatisfactory part on which she brings too much to bear; they have sent a woman to do a girl's job. Martin Balsam, a solid and satisfying naturalistic actor, plays a Hollywood agent, the part in which Axelrod has added his best touches to Capote. Mickey Rooney is made up for Mr. Yunioshi – and plays him – like a Hearst wartime anti-Japanese cartoon.

Blake Edwards is a director of ability who seems at present not quite sure of himself. The cocktail party is as excellent as if Billy Wilder had done it, but Holly's visit to Sing Sing just misses the comedy as Wilder would not have missed it. In striving for a style, Edwards includes two high overhead shots of a bed where one would have been superfluous; he has been bullied into including irrelevant "star" close-ups of Miss Hepburn; and his handling of the last scene in the rain is no fresher than the conception and the writing. But his work has flashes of bright possibility throughout.

There is nothing wrong with the Italian film *The Great War* that would not have been cured by its appearance thirty years earlier. This story of grimness and soldier humor in World War I is fluently directed by Mario Monicelli and is well acted by Vittorio Gassman (always better in parts with a comic

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


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edge) and Alberto Sordi. Even Silvana Mangano, as the Good-hearted Tart, has been directed into a semblance of vitality. But the script seems an instance of time-lag, as if *The Big Parade* had only recently wound its way into Italy, been translated, re-made, and shipped back. Doesn't Dino De Laurentiis, the producer, ever go to the movies? STANLEY KAUFFMANN

# *Correspondence*

## Escape from the Bomb

*Sirs:*

Having read and pondered Dr. Michihiko Hachiya's *Hiroshima Diary* and, as they arrive, the bulletins of the St. Louis Committee on Nuclear Information, and having been a civilian in London during five years of bombing (although admittedly that experience was scarecely a taste of what may come), I am ready to applaud the imaginative efforts of Dr. Lester Grinspoon and Dr. E. James Lieberman in "Escape from the Bomb" (September 4) to arouse us from our "apathy" to our danger.

But I wonder how helpful the doctors are. For instance, how many of us can, as they recommend we do, improve our chances of survival by fleeing "to a non-strategic area in the Southern Hemisphere, where fallout would be less" . . .? Do the doctors have any concept at all of immigration laws enforced by countries there? And since, as they say, we cannot by political action slow down the arms race, "much less reserve it," I am brought to their third point: "suicide kits to ensure as painless a death as possible." The doctors conclude that since people are not even thinking of suicide kits, the fact "shows how far they are from thinking about the holocaust in practical terms." Doubtless because of their training and profession, the doctors have some special knowledge that is denied the rest of us; therefore, I should like to ask them how an ordinary person can so equip himself and thus demonstrate to their satisfaction that some thought *is* being given to possible disaster "in practical terms."

*Elizabeth Keen*
*New Wilmington, Penna.*

*Sirs:*

Doctors Grinspoon and Lieberman are so lacking in faith (and fortitude) that they think it rational for Americans to flee. Russians, on the other hand, presumably will have sufficient faith to act irrationally. They will stay and fight. And thus are wars won without a shot having been fired in anger.

Fortunately, the overwhelming bulk of us will remain here to help maintoin our civilization. The fact that our standing fast helps to preserve a civilization which will continue to support destructive minded psychiatrists is, to me, ironical.

These doctors clearly illustrate why psychiatrists with limited backgrounds had best be left with their couches. Or, better yet, perhaps they should migrate to the Southern Hemisphere.

*Irving Peskoe*
*Homestead, Florida*

## The Population Explosion

*Sirs:*

TRB (August 7) may deplore the lack of attention given to the birth control problem by *Life* and *Look*, but has *The New Republic* ever devoted an issue to the "Population Explosion?" That the addition of some 140,000 new human beings to the world every day (net gain) nullifies all our feeble attempts at lifting the world living standards is obvious to all who will look, yet our leaders – even our new enlightened intellectuals of the New Frontier – continue to speak and act like they were living in another world. All our foreign aid, all the agricultural improvements in sight, all the blind faith in the ability of "science" somehow to find a way, all the romantic idiocy about man's migration to the moon will not prevent today's 2.5 billion from becoming six billion by the year 2000!

If United Nations estimates now list two-thirds of the world's peoples as hungry, what will be the percentage then? Even if every conceivable improvement and innovation in food production now contemplated (and this in turn depends largely on a world revo-



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lution in education) comes to pass, the number of people who are starving or malnourished, uneducated, ignorant, and therefore prone to totalitarian government, will still steadily increase. *This* is the major problem of our day, the underlying disease of our earth, and racial hatreds, poverty, Communism, and war are only ugly symptoms.

Yet the most popular President in our history was able to state that he could not "imagine anything more emphatically a subject that is not a proper political or governmental activity or function or responsibility." Not a cent of the $560 million spent per year at the National Institutes of Health is devoted to the problem which, more than any other, will determine the state of the world in the decades to come. Are we to let religious dogma, superstition, apathy and sheer blindness lead us to a choice between mass extermination and a world where we sit six in a room, eating plankton? I can think of no other subject more emphatically "a proper political or governmental activity or function or responsibility."

*L. F. Fenster, M.D.*
*New York, N.Y.*

## School Aid and the Church

*Sirs:*

You say that "... the school bill was defeated largely because Cardinal Spellman couldn't get [aid] for his parochial schools." ("School Aid and the Church," September 4). Let's add that NEA pressure for teacher's salary aid and the opposition of conservative businessmen and legislators to any form of federal aid were equally, if not more, potent factors. In any case, the parochial schools do *not* belong to Cardinal Spellman. They belong to millions of Americans who pay school taxes and personal income taxes. These same citizens insist on the inviolable and constitutionally-protected right of parents to control the education of their children. In the exercise of this right, in fidelity to their conscience, and in the exercise of their religious liberty they have decided that this education shall involve the study of religion and moral values in the classroom.

In opposing the recent federal aid bill, Catholics have asserted their refusal to have these rights nullified by the government's attaching to the exercise of these same rights an intolerable financial burden, a crushing disability before every law proposed or passed to aid education in this country. They will not permit church schools to be curtailed or to be taxed out of existence by the establishment of the principle that federal aid shall go to public schools only. The immediate benefit of the now defunct bill is not as important as the principal involved and the consequent control upon future policy. What future price may yet be exacted for the pursuance of religious liberty?

This controversy can have little meaning for those who took upon religious conviction as the indulgence of fancy. But those for whom religon is as dear as life itself can hardly imagine principles of greater moment being involved. *The New Republic* has stated its position that the state must, to no little extent, discourage parochial schools. Indeed, it has advocated the repeal of the legitimacy of bus transportation to parochial schools. Against such a tyranny of the state and such a shackling of religious liberty before the law the American Catholic community will stand firm. . . .

*Rev. Daniel S. Hamilton*
*St. Pius X Preparatory Seminary*
*Uniondale, N. Y.*

## What the President Defends

*Sirs:*

"The President of the United States," says Gerald Johnson, (September 4) "is sworn to defend the Constitution of the United States . . .; but he is not sworn to defend anything else, no matter what American spellbinders may say. . . ."

Is it as simple as that? (1) Various treaties made under authority of the United States contract the United States to the defense of great portions of the world. (2) The Constitution to which the President is sworn specifies as part of the supreme law of the land treaties made under authority of the United States. (3) The Constitution also explicitly obliges the President to take care that the law is faithfully excuted.

*Charles Burton Marshall*
*Arlington, Virginia*


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